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Buck v. Stephens 
15-8049 
Ruling Below: Buck v. Stephens, 630 F. App'x 251 (5th Cir. 2015) 
Buck was convicted on two counts of capital murder. During the sentencing phase, the state 
presented evidence intended to show that Buck would remain dangerous in the future. Busk 
called a clinical psychologist (Dr. Walter Quijano) as an expert witness, with the belief that the 
expert would testify on his behalf regarding future dangerousness. During cross examination, the 
prosecution elicited an affirmation from Quijano that Buck’s race (black) made him more likely 
to be dangerous in the future. The prosecution referenced this in closing arguments. 
Subsequently, the jury found that Buck was likely to be dangerous in the future, and sentenced 
him to death. 
Buck filed for a relief from judgment on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC). 
The district court denied the motion and declined to issue a Certificate of Appealability (COA), 
holding that Buck had failed to establish “extraordinary circumstances.” On appeal, the Fifth 
Circuit also denied the motion and declined to issue a COA for similar reasoning. 
Question Presented: Whether the Fifth Circuit imposed an improper and unduly burdensome 
Certificate of Appealability (COA) standard when it denied petitioner a COA on the basis of 
ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) as the foundation for a motion to reopen judgment and 
obtain a merits review, when counsel knowingly presented an “expert” who testified that 
petitioner’s race increased the likelihood of future dangerousness, where the issue of future 
dangerousness was crucial to the sentencing decision between life in prison or a death sentence. 
 
Duane Edward BUCK, Petitioner–Appellant, 
v. 
William STEPHENS, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional 
Institutions Division, Respondent–Appellee. 
 
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit 
Decided on August 20, 2015 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted] 
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Duane Buck seeks a certificate of 
appealability (“COA”) to challenge the 
denial of his motion for reconsideration, in 
which he sought to raise ineffective 
assistance of counsel (“IAC”) in seeking 
federal habeas corpus relief. Because he has 
not shown extraordinary circumstances that 
would permit relief under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), we deny the 
application for a COA. 
 
I. 
 
This is Buck's third trip to the Fifth Circuit. 
More detailed explanations of the facts and 
procedural history can be found in Buck v. 
Thaler, 345 Fed.Appx. 923 (5th Cir.2009) 
(per curiam), and Buck v. Thaler, 452 
Fed.Appx. 423 (5th Cir.2011) (per curiam). 
We recite only what is relevant to this request 
for a COA. 
 
In July 1995, Buck murdered his ex-
girlfriend Debra Gardner and her friend 
Kenneth Butler. Buck was arrested at the 
scene, and police found the murder weapons 
in the trunk of his car. Two witnesses 
identified him as the shooter. Buck laughed 
during and after the arrest and stated to one 
officer that “[t]he bitch got what she 
deserved.” 
 
Buck was convicted of capital murder for the 
deaths. During the penalty phase, the state 
presented evidence that Buck would likely 
remain dangerous. That evidence included 
his criminal history, his violent conduct, and 
his demeanor during and after the arrest. 
 
Buck called Dr. Walter Quijano, a clinical 
psychologist, as an expert witness to testify 
regarding future dangerousness. Buck's 
lawyer asked Quijano what factors he would 
look at to determine whether an inmate would 
engage in future acts of violence. Quijano 
explained several, including age, sex, race, 
social economics, and substance abuse. For 
example, he testified that advanced age and 
increased wealth correlated with a decline in 
the likelihood of committing future violent 
acts. On race, he gave a one-sentence 
explanation: “It's a sad commentary that 
minorities, Hispanics and black people, are 
over represented in the Criminal Justice 
System.” That matched a statement included 
in Quijano's expert report, which was 
introduced as evidence. 
 
During cross-examination, the prosecution 
elicited one more comment on race from 
Quijano: Question: “You have determined 
that the sex factor, that a male is more violent 
than a female because that's just the way it is, 
and that the race factor, black, increases the 
future dangerousness for various complicated 
reasons; is that correct?” Answer: “Yes.” 
During closing arguments, the prosecution 
referenced Quijano's testimony generally and 
specifically noted that he had said that, 
although Buck was in the low range for a 
probability of committing future violent acts, 
the probability did exist. The prosecution did 
not reference Buck's race or Quijano's use of 
race. 
 
The jury unanimously found beyond a 
reasonable doubt that there was a probability 
Buck would commit criminal acts of violence 
that would be a continuing threat to society. 
It further found that there were not sufficient 
mitigating circumstances to justify a life 
sentence. The court sentenced Buck to death, 
and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals 
(“TCCA”) affirmed. 
 
Buck filed his first state habeas application in 
1997; it contained no IAC claim or any other 
challenge based on Quijano's testimony. In 
2000, however, the Texas Attorney General 
(“AG”) admitted to the Supreme Court in 
Saldano v. Texas, that the state had erred in 
calling Quijano as a witness and having him 
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testify that the defendant's race increased the 
likelihood of future dangerousness. Shortly 
after the Court vacated and remanded 
Saldano on that confession of error, the AG 
publicly identified eight other cases 
involving racial testimony by Quijano, six of 
which the AG said were similar to Saldano's 
case; one of those was Buck's. Buck contends 
that Texas “promised to concede 
constitutional error and waive its procedural 
defenses” in his case so that he could get 
resentenced without the race-related 
testimony.  
 
In 2002, while his first state habeas petition 
was pending, Buck filed a second petition 
that challenged Quijano's testimony on 
several grounds, including IAC. The TCCA 
ultimately denied the first habeas petition and 
dismissed the second as an abuse of the writ. 
 
In 2004, Buck filed a federal habeas petition 
raising a litany of challenges to his sentence, 
including IAC. The court denied relief on that 
claim because Buck had not raised IAC on 
direct appeal or in his original state habeas 
petition. He had raised it in his second state 
habeas petition, but the TCCA dismissed it as 
an abuse of the writ, so it was procedurally 
defaulted. Buck sought a COA from this 
court on only one issue: “Was he deprived of 
due process or equal protection by the 
prosecution's reference to testimony from 
Buck's own penalty-phase expert witness ... 
?” We concluded that the claim was 
procedurally barred and meritless.  
 
After the state set an execution date of 
September 15, 2011, Buck moved for relief 
from the earlier district-court judgment under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), 
claiming that the state's failure to admit error 
and waive defenses was extraordinary and 
merited relief. The motion also asked for 
relief under Rule 60(d)(3), alleging that the 
AG had committed fraud on the court. 
The district court denied the motion and, 
three days later, Buck filed a motion to 
amend the judgment under Rule 59(e), 
claiming that the AG had made material 
misrepresentations and omissions in 
opposing the earlier motion for relief. The 
court denied that motion as well. We declined 
to permit a successive habeas petition or issue 
a COA.  
 
The Supreme Court stayed Buck's execution 
to consider his petition for writ of certiorari. 
It ultimately denied the petition, 
accompanied by a statement respecting that 
denial and a dissent.  
 
In 2013, Buck filed another state habeas 
petition. The trial court concluded that it was 
a subsequent petition and referred it to the 
TCCA. While that petition was pending, the 
Supreme Court decided Trevino v. Thaler, 
holding that Texas's procedural regime 
rendered it almost impossible to raise IAC 
claims on direct appeal, making the scheme 
similar to the one in Martinez v. Ryan. The 
Court therefore held that the Martinez 
exception applied in Texas: The lack of 
effective counsel during initial state 
collateral-review proceedings could excuse a 
procedural default on an IAC claim.  
 
The TCCA dismissed the petition as an abuse 
of the writ. Three judges dissented, 
concluding that Buck had made out a 
potentially meritorious case of IAC relating 
to his attorney's alleged failure adequately to 
investigate and present mitigating evidence.  
 
In January 2014, Buck again filed for Rule 
60(b)(6) relief from judgment in his federal 
habeas case. He focused solely on his IAC 
claim, contending that counsel was 
ineffective for introducing Quijano and that 
his case was sufficiently extraordinary to 
justify relief under Rule 60(b)(6). The district 
court denied the motion, holding that Buck's 
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case did not have the extraordinary 
circumstances required for Rule 60(b)(6). It 
also held that Buck had failed to make out an 
IAC claim, establishing deficient 
performance but not prejudice. Within a 
month of that denial, Buck again moved for 
relief under Rule 60(b)(6), essentially 
disagreeing with the district court's 
disposition of the issues. On March 11, 2015, 
the district court denied that motion as well 
and declined to issue a COA. 
 
II. 
 
To obtain a COA, Buck must make “a 
substantial showing of the denial of a 
constitutional right.” On application for a 
COA, we engage in “an overview of the 
claims in the habeas petition and a general 
assessment of their merits” but do not engage 
in “a full consideration of the factual or legal 
bases adduced in support of the claims,” 
asking only whether the district court's 
resolution of the claim “was debatable among 
jurists of reason.”  
 
The district court denied the motion for a 
procedural reason, namely, Buck's failure to 
show extraordinary circumstances justifying 
relief under Rule 60(b)(6). We therefore must 
deny a COA if Buck fails to establish both (1) 
that jurists of reason would find debatable 
“whether the petition states a valid claim of 
the denial of a constitutional right” and (2) 
that those jurists “would find it debatable 
whether the district court was correct in its 
procedural ruling.” 
 
III. 
 
Regarding the procedural bar, for a Rule 
60(b)(6) motion in this posture not to be itself 
a successive habeas petition, the litigant 
“must not be challenging a prior merits-based 
ruling.” Instead, he must be challenging a 
previous ruling—such as procedural default 
or a statute-of-limitations bar—that 
precluded a merits determination. The district 
court initially denied Buck's IAC claim 
because the TCCA's abuse-of-the-writ 
dismissal was an adequate and independent 
state ground for denying relief, so Buck's 
motion satisfies that requirement. 
To obtain relief under Rule 60(b)(6), Buck 
must show “extraordinary circumstances,” 
which “will rarely occur in the habeas 
context.” There is little guidance as to what 
constitutes “extraordinary circumstances,” 
but we have recognized that a change in a 
decisional law does not qualify, and we have 
cited with approval district-court decisions 
holding other circumstances not 
extraordinary as well, including IAC.  
 
Buck contends that eight equitable factors 
from Seven Elves, Inc. v. Eskenazi, are the 
proper means for evaluating a Rule 60(b) 
motion in a habeas case. We have declined to 
answer whether Seven Elves sets the standard 
for a Rule 60(b)(6) motion in habeas 
proceedings. We need not answer it now 
because Buck has not made out even a 
minimal showing that his case is exceptional. 
 
The January 2014 motion contains eleven 
facts, reurged in the COA application, that 
Buck says make the case extraordinary: 
 
1. Mr. Buck's trial attorney knowingly 
presented expert testimony to the sentencing 
jury that Mr. Buck's race made him more 
likely to be a future danger; 
 
2. Although required to act as gate-keeper to 
prevent unreliable expert opinions from 
reaching and influencing a jury, the trial court 
qualified Dr. Quijano as an expert on 
predictions of future dangerousness, allowed 
him to present race based opinion testimony 
to Mr. Buck's capital sentencing jury, and 
admitted Dr. Quijano's excludable hearsay 
report linking race to dangerousness; 
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3. The trial prosecutor intentionally elicited 
Dr. Quijano's testimony that Mr. Buck's race 
made him more likely to be a future danger 
on cross-examination, vouched for him as an 
“expert” in closing, and asked the jury to rely 
on Dr. Quijano's testimony to answer the 
future dangerousness special issue in the 
State's favor; 
 
4. Mr. Buck's state habeas counsel did not 
challenge trial counsel's introduction of this 
false and offensive testimony—or Texas's 
reliance on it—in Mr. Buck's initial state 
habeas application; 
 
5. The Texas Attorney General conceded 
constitutional error in Mr. Buck's case and 
promised to ensure that he received a new 
sentencing, but reneged on that promise after 
deciding that the introduction of the offensive 
testimony was trial counsel's fault; 
6. This Court ruled that federal review of Mr. 
Buck's trial counsel ineffectiveness claim 
was foreclosed by state habeas counsel's 
failure to raise and litigate the issue in Mr. 
Buck's initial state habeas petition, relying on 
Coleman, which has subsequently been 
modified by Martinez and Trevino; 
 
7. The Fifth Circuit held Mr. Buck's trial 
counsel responsible for the introduction of 
Dr. Quijano's testimony linking Mr. Buck's 
race to his likelihood of future 
dangerousness; 
 
8. Three Supreme Court Justices concluded 
that trial counsel was at fault for the 
introduction of Dr. Quijano's testimony; 
 
9. Three Judges of the CCA found that 
“because [Mr. Buck's] initial habeas counsel 
failed to include any claims related to 
Quijano's testimony in his original [state 
habeas] application, no court, state or federal, 
has ever considered the merits of those 
claims;” 
10. Mr. Buck's case is the only one in which 
Texas has broken its promise to waive 
procedural defenses and concede error, 
leaving Mr. Buck as the only individual in 
Texas facing execution without having been 
afforded a fair and unbiased sentencing 
hearing; and 
 
11. Martinez and Trevino now allow for 
federal court review of “substantial” 
defaulted claims of trial counsel 
ineffectiveness. 
 
Initial examination of those facts reveals that 
they are not extraordinary at all in the habeas 
context. Numbers 1–3, 7, and 8 are just 
variations on the merits of Buck's IAC claim, 
which is at least unremarkable as far as IAC 
claims go. Buck's IAC claim is not so 
different in kind or degree from other 
disagreements over trial strategy between 
lawyer and client that it counts as an 
exceptional case. Nor are IAC claims as a 
class extraordinary under Rule 60(b)(6). The 
Court warned in Gonzalez that extraordinary 
circumstances will rarely be present in the 
habeas context. 
 
The fourth and ninth extraordinary facts 
merely point out that Buck's IAC claim was 
procedurally defaulted and did not get a 
merits determination. That is not an 
extraordinary circumstance in the habeas 
context; it is the nature of procedural defaults 
that many potentially viable claims will never 
advance to a merits determination. No jurists 
of reason would expand the definition of 
“extraordinary” to reach all procedurally 
defaulted IAC claims. 
 
The sixth and eleventh facts relate to Buck's 
notion that Trevino and Martinez changed the 
law regarding procedural defaults in IAC 
claims in a way that could have excused his 
procedural default. Martinez, however, “was 
simply a change in decisional law” that is not 
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an extraordinary circumstance under Rule 
60(b)(6), and “Trevino's recent application of 
Martinez to Texas cases does not change that 
conclusion in any way.”  
 
Those facts plainly fail to make even a 
plausible argument that Buck's is the 
extraordinary case that satisfies Rule 
60(b)(6). He has repeatedly asserted, 
however, that his case is special because of 
the Saldano-related statements by the AG. 
Buck contends the AG conceded that 
Quijano's testimony was unconstitutional but 
reneged on a promise to resentence Buck 
(fact five), despite Texas's following through 
in other cases involving Quijano (fact ten). 
 
Even if the AG initially indicated to Buck that 
he would be resentenced—a fact that has 
never been adequately established—his 
decision not to follow through is not 
extraordinary. The broken-promise element 
to this case makes it odd and factually 
unusual, but extraordinary circumstances are 
not merely found on the spectrum of common 
circumstances to unique circumstances. And 
they must be extraordinary circumstances 
“justifying relief from the judgment.” Buck 
has not shown why the alleged reneging 
would justify relief from the judgment. For 
example, he has not shown that he relied on 
the alleged promise to his detriment. 
 
Nor is it extraordinary that the AG confessed 
error and waived procedural bars in other 
cases and not in Buck's. We have previously 
rejected the notion that some concept of 
“intra-court comity” requires the state to 
waive procedural defenses in similar cases. 
Even assuming arguendo that the other cases 
at issue are materially similar to Buck's 
(which the state disputes), it can hardly be 
extraordinary that the state chose different 
litigation strategies between the two cases. 
Jurists of reason would not debate that Buck 
has failed to show extraordinary 
circumstances justifying relief. 
 
Buck has not demonstrated that jurists of 
reason would debate whether his case is 
exceptional under Rule 60(b)(6). The request 
for a COA is DENIED.
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“Supreme Court to reconsider two death penalty cases and take up a 
redistricting dispute” 
 
Los Angeles Times 
David G. Savage 
June 6, 2016 
 
[Excerpt; References to Moore v. Texas have 
been omitted.] 
The Supreme Court said Monday it will 
reconsider two Texas death penalty cases and 
rule on whether evidence of racial bias and 
mental impairment calls for removing the 
defendants from death row. 
Separately, the justices took up a political 
redistricting dispute, which asks them to take 
a stronger stand against racial 
gerrymandering. 
The two death penalty cases will be heard in 
the next term beginning in the fall. Neither 
asks the high court to strike down the death 
penalty, but they have the potential to set 
stricter limits on executions and the use of 
capital punishment. 
In one case, a man convicted of a 1980 
shooting during a store robbery in Houston 
says he suffers from a mild mental disability. 
The justices agreed to hear his claim that 
prosecutors and judges in Texas have ignored 
earlier rulings that barred executing inmates 
with a mental impairment. 
The other case involves an African American 
defendant who was sentenced to death after 
the jury was told he may be especially 
dangerous in the future because of his race. 
The justices agreed to hear his claim that such 
racial bias is cause to set aside his death 
sentence. 
Last year, liberal Justices Stephen Breyer and 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg said they now believe 
the death penalty system is so badly flawed 
as to be unconstitutional. There has been no 
sign a majority agrees with them. 
But if a liberal justice were to join the court 
in the next term, there may well be a five-
member majority to enforce tighter limits on 
the use of capital punishment. 
The February death of Justice Antonin Scalia 
has left the court with a vacancy, and the 
GOP-controlled Senate is refusing to 
consider President Obama’s nomination of 
Judge Merrick Garland, saying the decision 
should be left to the next president. 
Since Scalia’s death, the eight justices have 
steered clear of taking new cases that could 
provoke an ideological divide or a 4-4 
deadlock. But the Texas cases may be the 
exception and lead to rulings that sharply 
split the court.    
[…] 
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In the second case, lawyers for the NAACP 
Legal Defense Fund urged the justices to set 
aside the death sentence for Duane Buck 
because of trial testimony suggesting that 
black people are more dangerous. 
“Trial counsel's knowing reliance on false, 
inflammatory and deeply prejudicial 
evidence explicitly linking Mr. Buck's race to 
his likelihood of future dangerousness is 
plainly extraordinary,” they said in the case 
of Buck vs. Stephens. “We are hopeful that 
the Supreme Court will correct this egregious 
error, and that Texas will acknowledge Mr. 
Buck's right to a new sentencing hearing free 
of racial bias.” 
[…] 
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“U.S. top court to hear appeals by two black Texas death row inmates” 
 
Reuters 
Lawrence Hurley 
June 6, 2016 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed on Monday 
to take up two death penalty appeals brought 
by black Texas inmates, one citing racially 
tinged trial testimony and the other 
challenging how the state gauges intellectual 
disabilities that could preclude execution. 
The cases involve convicted murderers 
Duane Buck and Bobby Moore, who are 
challenging their sentences in a state that 
executes more death row inmates than any 
other. Both crimes occurred in Houston. 
They are the only death penalty cases the 
court has taken up so far for its next term, 
which starts in October and ends in June 
2017. 
Buck, 52, was convicted in 1995 of fatally 
shooting his former girlfriend while her 
young children watched, as well as another 
man. He is seeking a new sentencing hearing, 
claiming his trial lawyer was ineffective and 
that the proceedings were tainted by racial 
discrimination. 
His current lawyers said in court papers the 
lawyer who represented Buck at his trial 
called a clinical psychologist as a defense 
witness to testify on the likelihood of Buck 
committing future offenses. The expert 
testified that Buck was more likely to be 
dangerous because he is black. Buck's current 
lawyers said in court papers that "the alleged 
link between race and future dangerousness 
has been proven false." 
"We are hopeful that the Supreme Court will 
correct this egregious error, and that Texas 
will acknowledge Mr. Buck's right to a new 
sentencing hearing free of racial bias. Justice 
can only be served in this extraordinary case 
of racial bias by a new sentencing hearing 
free of inflammatory, inaccurate 
stereotypes," Buck's lawyers said in a 
statement. 
Intellectual Disability Evidence 
Moore, 56, was convicted at age 20 of fatally 
shooting a 70-year-old grocery clerk during a 
1980 robbery. 
His appeal seeking to overturn his death 
sentence focuses on how judges should 
weigh medical evidence of intellectual 
disability. Under Supreme Court precedent, 
people who are intellectually disabled cannot 
be sentenced to death. His lawyers said that a 
lower court found that Moore's IQ of 70 was 
"within the range of mild mental retardation." 
The standard for assessing intellectual 
disability is crucial because the Supreme 
Court in 2002 ruled that the execution of 
intellectually disabled, or mentally retarded, 
defendants violates the U.S. Constitution's 
ban on cruel and unusual punishment. 
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Moore's lawyers argued that the lower court 
wrongly used an "outdated" 23-year-old 
definition used in Texas of intellectual 
disability when it determined that Moore was 
not intellectually disabled. 
Moore's lawyers also had asked the Supreme 
Court to consider the question of whether the 
amount of time he has spent on death row 
awaiting execution since his 1980 conviction 
violates the Constitution's ban on cruel and 
unusual punishment. The justices declined to 
decide that issue, although the court on 
Monday initially announced in error that they 
would. 
Moore has been held for 15 years in solitary 
confinement, his lawyers said. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Supreme Court's justices have sharply 
disagreed among themselves over capital 
punishment. Last year, they upheld 
Oklahoma's lethal injection process in a 5-4 
ruling. Two of the court's liberals who 
dissented in that ruling, Stephen Breyer and 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, raised concerns that 
the death penalty amounts to cruel and 
unusual punishment. 
But the court has shown no signs it will take 
up the broader question of the 
constitutionality of the death penalty. 
Last week, it rejected a black Louisiana death 
row inmate's appeal making that claim, with 
Breyer again expressing his view that the 
death penalty may be unconstitutional in part 
because of geographical disparities in the 
way it is implemented.
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“Supreme Court Takes Up 2 Texas Death Penalty Appeals” 
 
Law360 
Jess Davis 
June 6, 2016 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court on Monday agreed 
to review two Texas death penalty cases that 
question the constitutionality of such 
sentences for individuals with intellectual 
disabilities and question when expert 
witnesses testify about a defendant’s 
proclivity for future violence based on race. 
Although the court initially indicated that it 
would also consider the question of whether 
execution of a condemned individual more 
than 35 years after he was placed on death 
row constitutes cruel and unusual 
punishment, a corrected orders list released 
later on Monday morning narrowed the focus 
of that appeal — Bobby Moore v. Texas — 
to intellectual disability only. 
The Moore case will now be considered only 
on the question of whether current medical 
standards on intellectual disability should 
displace outdated precedent. Moore, who was 
found to have an IQ of 70, was sentenced to 
death after a robbery attempt in which he was 
found to have shot and killed a store 
employee. 
The second case is Duane Buck v. William 
Stephens, director of the Texas Department 
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions 
Division, in which Buck claims ineffective 
assistance of counsel. During his trial, Buck’s 
defense lawyer presented an expert witness 
who testified that Buck was more likely to be 
dangerous in the future because he is black, 
in a case in which future dangerousness was 
both a prerequisite for a death sentence and 
the central issue at sentencing, according to 
his petition for certiorari. 
Buck’s defense lawyers say that his case is an 
“extraordinary instance of racial bias” that 
interfered with his right to fair sentencing, 
and said in a statement on Monday that the 
court’s decision to hear his appeal is “an 
important step toward restoring public 
confidence in the integrity of the courts.” 
“At this point in time, our national 
conversation about race makes this case all 
the more important,” Buck attorney Kate 
Black of the Texas Defender Service told 
Law360 on Monday. “Duane Buck’s case 
and the way it’s been treated is widely out of 
step with other circuits.” 
Counsel for the state and for Moore did not 
immediately respond to requests for 
comment on Monday. 
Texas opposed the petitions for certiorari in 
both cases. 
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In Moore’s case, the state argued that 
individual states are responsible for 
developing appropriate ways to enforce a 
constitutional restriction against executing 
intellectually disabled offenders, and said 
that no previous Supreme Court precedent 
requires it to employ a given clinical 
definition of intellectual disability. Texas 
argued that the standard used to evaluate 
Moore is “remarkably similar” to the current 
definition espoused by the medical 
community, making distinction unnecessary, 
and said that the legal decision of whether a 
defendant is intellectually disabled belongs in 
the hands of the judicial system, not medical 
professionals. 
Buck was found guilty for the shooting 
deaths of his ex-girlfriend and another man. 
In his case, Texas argued that the defense 
expert testified only that minorities, 
Hispanics and blacks were overrepresented in 
the criminal justice system and said that the 
expert witness did not tie Buck’s race to his 
future dangerousness. Texas told the 
Supreme Court that the jury heard evidence 
of Buck’s past criminal record and testimony 
from another ex-girlfriend about his future 
propensity to violence that supported its 
finding. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
oore is represented by Cliff Sloan, Donald 
Salzman, Lauryn Fraas, Michael McIntosh, 
Brendan Gants, Luke Varley, Alex Blaszczuk 
and Peter Horn of Skadden Arps Slate 
Meagher & Flom LLP. 
Buck is represented by Sherrilyn Ifill, Janai 
Nelson, Christina Swarns, Jin Hee Lee, 
Natasha Korgaonkar and Natasha Merle of 
the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational 
Fund Inc., Kathryn Kase and Kate Black of 
the Texas Defender Service, and Samuel 
Spital of Holland & Knight LLP. 
Texas is represented by Ken Paxton, Jeff 
Mateer, Adrienne McFarland, Edward L. 
Marshall and Fredericka Sargent of the Texas 
Attorney General’s office. Stephens is also 
represented by Jeremy Greenwell of the 
Attorney General’s office
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“Man Sentenced To Die After ‘Expert’ Testified That Black People Are 
Dangerous” 
 
Think Progress 
Ian Millhiser 
April 25, 2016 
 
Duane Edward Buck’s lawyers were a 
disaster. 
After Buck was convicted of murder, his own 
attorneys retained a now-discredited 
psychologist who testified that Mr. Buck is 
more likely to be a danger to society in the 
future because he is black. This testimony 
then went unchallenged at a later, crucial 
state court proceeding even though Buck was 
then represented by a new lawyer. The only 
new claim that lawyer raised at this 
proceeding was “based on a non-existent 
provision of the penal code.” 
Now, nearly two decades after his conviction, 
no court has considered whether the racist 
testimony elicited at Buck’s trial caused him 
to be sentenced to death. Moreover, thanks to 
errors committed by his previous lawyers and 
an array of laws and legal doctrines that often 
elevate the finality of convictions ahead of 
the need to ensure that innocents are not 
punished and that the death penalty is not 
doled out unnecessarily, it is far from clear 
that any court will examine the impact of this 
racist testimony before Mr. Buck is put to 
death. 
The specific legal issue in Buck v. Stephens 
is complex enough to make a lawyer’s brain 
bleed. Specifically, Mr. Buck is seeking 
permission to seek a determination of 
whether “extraordinary circumstances” exist 
that would permit a lower court to determine 
whether the racist testimony elicited by his 
own counsel prejudiced the outcome of his 
sentencing proceeding. If he somehow 
succeeds in navigating this maze, he wins a 
new sentencing hearing — which could very 
well determine that he should be re-sentenced 
to death. 
It’s a giant procedural mess. And it’s a mess 
that Texas, at one point, appeared willing to 
set aside. In 2000, then-Texas Attorney 
General John Cornyn (now a U.S. Senator) 
determined that Dr. Walter Quijano, the 
psychologist who testified in Buck’s case, 
had a record of appearing in capital 
sentencing proceedings and offering racist 
testimony. In Buck’s case, Quijano testified 
that African-Americans and Hispanics are 
especially likely to be dangerous as they are 
“over represented in the Criminal Justice 
System.” 
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This is not simply a case of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, this is a case of 
ineffective assistance of counsel aggravated 
by even more ineffective assistance of 
counsel. 
Cornyn’s office found six additional cases 
where Dr. Quijano offered similar testimony, 
and it announced that it “will not object” if 
the inmates sentenced to die in these cases 
“seek to overturn the death sentences based 
on Mr. Quijano’s testimony.” As Cornyn’s 
office admitted in a brief filed in one of these 
cases “infusion of race as a factor for the jury 
to weigh in making its determination violated 
[a defendant’s] constitutional right to be 
sentenced without regard to the color of his 
skin.” 
Nevertheless, when Buck sought relief from 
his death sentence four years later in federal 
court, the state did not keep its promise. 
Texas now claims that Buck’s case differs 
from the other six cases specifically because 
Dr. Quijano’s racist conclusions were placed 
before the jury by Buck’s own counsel. As 
Justice Samuel Alito argued in a 2011 
opinion explaining why he did not believe 
that the Supreme Court should have heard a 
previous iteration of Buck’s case, “only in 
Buck’s case did defense counsel elicit the 
race-related testimony on direct examination. 
Thus, this is the only case in which it can be 
said that the responsibility for eliciting the 
offensive testimony lay squarely with the 
defense.” 
That may very well be true, but it is an odd 
conclusion for a judge charged with 
interpreting a Constitution that not only 
forbids race discrimination in sentencing, but 
that also forbids sentencing someone to die 
without adequate assistance of counsel. Buck 
argues that he is the victim to two 
overlapping constitutional violations — he 
did not receive adequate assistance of 
counsel and, for that very reason, his own 
lawyer introduced unconstitutional evidence 
against him. Justice Alito, by contrast, 
appears to claim that the first of these two 
constitutional violations excuses the second. 
In fairness, the real reason why Buck has 
previously been unable to assert his claim 
that he received ineffective legal assistance is 
a bit more complicated. For this is not simply 
a case of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
this is a case of ineffective assistance of 
counsel aggravated by even more ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 
In 1999, sometime after Buck received a 
death sentence, a new lawyer was appointed 
to represent the inmate in state habeas 
proceedings — a round of proceedings Texas 
state law permits for individuals seeking to 
challenge a death sentence. That lawyer, 
according to the petition now pending before 
the Supreme Court, “had a history of 
deficient representation of death-sentenced 
prisoners,” including one case where he 
“threw his client ‘under the bus’ by filing an 
initial state habeas application that was ‘only 
four pages long and merely state[d] factual 
and legal conclusions.’” 
While Buck’s original lawyers’ sin was a sin 
of commission — that is, they were the ones 
who introduced Dr. Quijano’s racist 
testimony — the new lawyer’s sin was a sin 
of omission. The new lawyer did not 
challenge the original legal team’s decision 
to present Quijano’s testimony to the jury. 
That failure to assert what may be Buck’s 
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strongest legal claim at a relatively early 
stage in this litigation had devastating 
consequences once Buck’s case reached 
federal court. As a federal district judge 
explained, Buck’s claim that his original 
lawyers screwed up was “procedurally 
defaulted” because his new lawyer failed to 
raise this claim soon enough. Thus Buck risks 
losing the ability to assert this claim forever. 
Then, in 2013, Buck finally got a piece of 
good news. In a pair of cases, Martinez v. 
Ryan and Trevino v. Thaler, the Supreme 
Court held that there should be a “narrow 
exception” to the previously existing rule that 
“an attorney’s ignorance or inadvertence in a 
postconviction proceeding does not qualify 
as cause to excuse a procedural default.” 
Thanks to these decisions, Buck now has a 
shot at overcoming the two rounds of 
ineffective legal representation he received 
over a decade ago. 
To be sure, the path ahead for him will not be 
easy. Buck still must navigate a maze of 
procedural obstacles, and his only chances of 
finding the end of this maze depends on legal 
doctrines that use phrases like “narrow 
exception” and “extraordinary 
circumstances.” Buck’s path to relief from 
his death sentence is riddled with obstacles 
that very few litigants manage to surmount. 
Which brings us to the final irony in Mr. 
Buck’s case. At the earliest stages of the 
many rounds of litigation concerning his 
sentence, Buck faced none of these nearly 
insurmountable procedural obstacles. And 
yet he appears to have received two rounds of 
unconstitutionally ineffective legal 
assistance.  
Now, however, when Buck is hemmed in by 
almost immovable legal barriers, he is backed 
by a simply staggering array of legal talent. 
The team of attorneys representing Buck in 
the Supreme Court includes six lawyers from 
the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, the historic 
civil rights organization founded by future 
Justice Thurgood Marshall. It also includes a 
partner in a large law firm who previously 
clerked for a Supreme Court justice. That’s 
enough legal firepower to level a mountain. 
This is not an uncommon practice in capital 
cases, where high-octane lawyers frequently 
take over cases that present issues worthy of 
Supreme Court review years after a death row 
inmate received far-from-outstanding 
representation. 
Excellent attorneys — and certainly, the kind 
of extraordinary attorneys who now represent 
Mr. Buck — are a sparse resource. It’s not 
realistic to expect lawyers of the caliber of his 
current legal team to represent every criminal 
defendant who faces a death sentence. 
Nevertheless, there is something profoundly 
misguided about a system that assigns such 
defendants’ lawyers who aren’t even 
minimally adequate when those defendants 
need good lawyers the most. 
Mr. Buck’s case, in other words, is a tale of 
racism compounded by double standards, 
poor legal representation, and a system that 
often says that it is more important to have 
certainty in death sentencing than it is for 
courts to reach the proper result. And now 
that he finally has more-than-adequate 
representation, Buck could very well learn 
that the cavalry arrived too late.  
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Moore v. Texas 
15-797 
Ruling Below: Ex Parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d 481 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) 
Moore was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. Moore filed for a relief from 
judgment on the grounds that Moore possessed an intellectual disability that would preclude a 
death sentence under the Eighth Amendment. The conviction was affirmed on appeal. Moore 
next sought federal habeas relief. The District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted 
relief, and the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed as modified and remanded. 
The 185th Judicial District Court, Harris County, once again sentenced the defendant to death. 
The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed on appeal. Moore sought a writ of habeas corpus, and a 
habeas judge granted relief in part and denied relief in part. The Court of Criminal Appeals then 
denied relief in all parts. 
Question Presented: Whether prohibiting the use of modern medical standards in the evaluation 
of mental disability for the purpose of determining whether an individual may be executed 
violates the Eighth Amendment and the decisions in Hall v. Florida and Atkins v. Virginia. 
 
Ex Parte Bobby James Moore, Applicant. 
 
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas 
Decided on September 16, 2015 
[Excerpt; some citations, footnotes, and elements not subject to certiorari grant are omitted]
 
 
In 1980, appellant was convicted of capital 
murder and sentenced to death for fatally 
shooting a seventy-year-old grocery clerk, 
James McCarble, in Houston, Texas, while 
committing or attempting to commit robbery. 
We affirmed the 1980 conviction and 
sentence. Following a grant of federal habeas 
corpus relief, the trial court held a new 
punishment hearing in February 2001. 
Appellant again received a death sentence. 
We affirmed the trial court’s judgment on 
direct appeal.  
In this initial writ application challenging his 
2001 punishment retrial and death sentence, 
applicant raises forty-eight claims for relief.  
In January 2014, the habeas judge held a two-
day evidentiary hearing on applicant’s first 
claim for relief—the allegation that he is 
intellectually disabled and therefore exempt 
from execution under the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 
321 (2002).  
 
Following the evidentiary hearing, the parties 
filed proposed findings of fact and 
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conclusions of law. Applicant’s proposed 
findings and conclusions were contained in a 
document entitled, “Addendum Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law on Claims 1–3” 
(Addendum Findings). Despite the 
document’s caption, applicant’s proposed 
findings and conclusions addressed only his 
Atkins claim (i.e., his first claim for relief). 
The State’s proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law addressed all of 
applicant’s alleged grounds for relief. 
 
The habeas court signed applicant’s proposed 
Addendum Findings. The Addendum 
Findings applied the definition of intellectual 
disability presently used by the American 
Association on Intellectual and 
Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD), 
concluded that applicant is intellectually 
disabled under that definition, and 
recommended that we grant relief on his 
Atkins claim. The Addendum Findings also 
concluded that applicant had established by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he is 
intellectually disabled under the diagnostic 
criteria stated in the fourth and fifth editions 
of the American Psychiatric Association’s 
(APA’s) Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (DSM), i.e., the DSM-IV 
and DSM-V. 
 
The habeas court also signed the State’s 
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of 
law after making certain handwritten 
alterations to the final page. Through its 
alterations, the habeas court: (1) indicated 
that applicant’s grounds for relief should be 
granted in part and denied in part; and (2) 
adopted the State’s proposed findings and 
conclusions concerning claims four through 
forty-eight, as well as its recommendation 
that we deny relief concerning those claims. 
The habeas court made no findings or 
conclusions regarding applicant’s claims two 
and three. 
We filed and set the case to address 
applicant’s Atkins allegation. We now deny 
relief on all of applicant’s claims. 
 
In Atkins, the Supreme Court determined that 
the execution of intellectually disabled 
individuals violates the Eighth Amendment, 
but left it to the States to develop appropriate 
ways to enforce the constitutional restriction. 
See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317, 320. In Ex parte 
Briseno, citing the absence of legislation to 
implement Atkins’s mandate, we adopted the 
definition of intellectual disability stated in 
the ninth edition of the AAMR manual, 
published in 1992, and the similar definition 
of intellectual disability contained in section 
591.003(13) of the Texas Health and Safety 
Code.  
 
Because our Legislature has not enacted 
legislation to implement Atkins’s mandate, 
we continue to follow the AAMR’s 1992 
definition of intellectual disability that we 
adopted in Briseno for Atkins claims 
presented in Texas death-penalty cases. Thus, 
to demonstrate that he is intellectually 
disabled for Eighth Amendment purposes 
and therefore exempt from execution, an 
applicant must prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence that: (1) he suffers from 
significantly subaverage general intellectual 
functioning, generally shown by an 
intelligence quotient (IQ) of 70 or less; (2) his 
significantly sub-average general intellectual 
functioning is accompanied by related and 
significant limitations in adaptive 
functioning; and (3) the onset of the above 
two characteristics occurred before the age of 
eighteen. 
 
The habeas judge therefore erred by 
disregarding our case law and employing the 
definition of intellectual disability presently 
used by the AAIDD, a definition which 
notably omits the requirement that an 
individual’s adaptive behavior deficits, if 
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any, must be “related to” significantly sub-
average general intellectual functioning. The 
habeas court reasoned that, in Briseno, we 
derived our legal test for intellectual 
disability in capital cases from the AAMR’s 
1992 definition of intellectual disability. 
Because the AAMR’s and APA’s 
conceptions of intellectual disability and its 
diagnosis have changed since Atkins and 
Briseno were decided, the habeas court 
concluded that it should use the most current 
position, as espoused byAAIDD, regarding 
the diagnosis of intellectual disability rather 
than the test that we established in Briseno. 
 
It may be true that the AAIDD’s and APA’s 
positions regarding the diagnosis of 
intellectual disability have changed since 
Atkins and Briseno were decided. Indeed, we 
have recently discussed the subjectivity 
surrounding the medical diagnosis of 
intellectual disability and some of the causes 
for that subjectivity. But although the mental-
health fields and opinions of mental-health 
experts inform the factual decision, they do 
not determine whether an individual is 
exempt from execution under Atkins. The 
decision to modify the legal standard for 
intellectual disability in the capital-
sentencing context rests with this Court 
unless and until the Legislature acts, which 
we have repeatedly asked it to do. We 
conclude that, at this juncture, the legal test 
we established in Briseno remains adequately 
“informed by the medical community’s 
diagnostic framework.”  
 
Regarding Briseno’s first prong, “general 
intellectual functioning” is “defined by the 
[IQ]” and “obtained by assessment with a 
standardized, individually administered 
intelligence test.” There is a measurement 
error of approximately five points in 
assessing IQ, which may vary from 
instrument to instrument. Therefore, when 
determining whether an applicant has met 
Briseno’s first prong, we consider the fact 
that any IQ score could actually represent a 
score that is five points higher or five points 
lower than the score that he actually obtained.  
 
In Cathey, we examined whether mental-
health experts or factfinders should adjust 
IQ scores for the “Flynn Effect” in making a 
determination of intellectual disability under 
Atkins. We concluded that, although 
factfinders may consider the concept of the 
Flynn Effect in assessing the validity of a 
score obtained on a now “outmoded” or 
“outdated” version of an IQ test, they may 
consider that effect only in the way that they 
consider an IQ examiner’s assessment of 
malingering, depression, lack of 
concentration, etc. We stated that the IQ test 
score itself may not be changed. In analyzing 
whether applicant’s general intellectual 
functioning is significantly sub-average, the 
habeas court therefore erred by subtracting 
points from applicant’s IQ scores for the 
Flynn Effect and considering both applicant’s 
unadjusted and Flynn-Effect-adjusted IQ 
scores. 
 
For purposes of the Eighth Amendment, 
“adaptive behavior” refers to the ordinary 
skills that are required for people to function 
in their everyday lives. We have cited with 
approval the AAIDD’s grouping of adaptive 
behavior into three areas (conceptual skills, 
social skills, and practical skills) for purposes 
of making a clinical diagnosis of intellectual 
disability. Limitations in adaptive behavior 
can be determined by using standardized 
tests. We have also recognized the APA’s 
position, expressed in the DSM-IV, that for 
purposes of clinical diagnosis, a “significant 
limitation” is defined by a score of at least 
two standard deviations below either (1) the 
mean in one of the three adaptive behavior 
skills areas or (2) the overall score on a 
standardized measure of conceptual, social, 
and practical skills. Although standardized 
tests are not the sole measure of adaptive 
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functioning, they may be helpful to the 
factfinder, who has the ultimate 
responsibility for determining intellectual 
disability in the Atkins context.  
 
In the Eighth Amendment context, it is not 
sufficient for an applicant to establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he has 
significantly sub-average general intellectual 
functioning and significant limitations in 
adaptive functioning. An applicant must also 
demonstrate by a preponderance of the 
evidence that his adaptive behavior deficits 
are related to significantly sub-average 
general intellectual functioning rather than 
some other cause. The habeas court in this 
case failed to make the relatedness inquiry. 
 
In making the relatedness determination, the 
factfinder may consider the seven evidentiary 
factors that we developed in Briseno: 
 
• Did those who knew the person best 
during the developmental stage—his 
family, friends, teachers, employers, 
authorities—think he was 
[intellectually disabled] at that time, 
and, if so, act in accordance with that 
determination? 
 
• Has the person formulated plans and 
carried them through or is his conduct 
impulsive? 
 
• Does his conduct show leadership or 
does it show that he is led around by 
others? 
 
• Is his conduct in response to external 
stimuli rational and appropriate, 
regardless of whether it is socially 
acceptable? 
 
• Does he respond coherently, 
rationally, and on point to oral or 
written questions or do his responses 
wander from subject to subject? 
 
• Can the person hide facts or lie 
effectively in his own or others’ 
interests? 
 
• Putting aside any heinousness or 
gruesomeness surrounding the capital 
offense, did the commission of that 
offense require forethought, 
planning, and complex execution of 
purpose? 
 
We look to the entirety of the record before 
us in an Atkins inquiry. In addition, we 
“consider all of the person’s functional 
abilities,” including “those that show strength 
as well as those that show weakness.” The 
habeas court therefore additionally erred to 
the extent that it found that applicant’s prison 
records were “not appropriate tools by which 
to exclude intellectual disability in capital 
murder cases” and considered only 
weaknesses in applicant’s functional 
abilities. 
  
In failing to make the relatedness inquiry, the 
habeas judge’s factual findings and legal 
conclusions left the second prong of the 
Briseno test unresolved. In addition, our 
independent review of the record reveals that 
it does not support the habeas judge’s 
findings or conclusions concerning 
applicant’s Atkins claim. In short, the habeas 
judge appears to have either not considered, 
or unreasonably disregarded, a vast array of 
evidence in this lengthy record that cannot 
rationally be squared with a finding of 
intellectual-disability. For these reasons, we 
do not adopt the habeas court’s findings and 
conclusions regarding applicant’s Atkins 
claim, but instead assume our role as the 
ultimate factfinder in this case.  
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We hold that applicant has not established by 
a preponderance of the evidence that he is 
intellectually disabled under Atkins and 
Briseno. Accordingly, applicant is not 
exempt from the death penalty, and we deny 
him relief on his first ground. 
 
I. Factual and Procedural Background 
 
The lengthy factual and procedural history of 
applicant’s case is relevant to our 
adjudication of his Atkins claim and provides 
context for the testimony elicited by the 
parties at his 2014 evidentiary hearing. 
 
A. Applicant’s 1980 Capital Murder Trial 
 
The evidence at applicant’s 1980 trial 
showed that, on April 25, 1980, Anthony 
Pradia and Willie Albert “Ricky” Koonce 
visited applicant at Betty Nolan’s house, 10 
where applicant lived when he was not 
staying with his girlfriend, Shirley Carmen. 
Pradia testified that he, Koonce, and 
applicant each needed money for car 
payments. While the three men were playing 
dice, Koonce suggested that they commit a 
robbery, and Pradia and applicant agreed. 
Applicant provided the weapons for the 
robbery, specifically, a shotgun and a .32 
caliber pistol. Applicant and Pradia hid the 
weapons in the trunk of Koonce’s car. The 
three men then drove around various areas of 
Houston in Koonce’s car, looking for a place 
in which to commit the robbery. 
 
After taking turns casing the Birdsall Super 
Market, the three men settled on it as the 
place in which they would commit the 
robbery and negotiated how they would 
divide the proceeds. Because they were using 
his car, Koonce wanted a larger share of the 
proceeds. After some argument, Pradia and 
applicant agreed that they would each pay 
Koonce $200 from their shares. The men then 
discussed their roles in the robbery. They 
agreed that Koonce would enter the courtesy 
booth and take the money that was inside. 
Applicant would carry the shotgun and 
position himself at the courtesy booth so that 
he could guard the booth and watch the 
store’s front entrance. Pradia would carry the 
pistol and empty the checkout registers. 
 
The three men then entered the store. Pradia 
entered first, with the pistol in his pants. 
Koonce entered next. Applicant entered last. 
The shotgun he was carrying was obscured 
by two plastic bags. Applicant and Pradia 
wore wigs. Applicant also wore sunglasses. 
 
Applicant and Koonce approached the 
courtesy booth, which was staffed by store 
employees McCarble and Edna Scott. 
Koonce entered the booth, told McCarble and 
Scott that they were being robbed, and 
demanded money. Applicant, who by this 
time had removed the plastic bags from the 
shotgun, pointed the weapon at McCarble 
and Scott through the booth’s window. When 
Scott screamed that the store was being 
robbed, applicant pointed the shotgun at 
McCarble, looked down the barrel, and shot 
him in the head. McCarble died instantly. 
 
Applicant, Pradia, and Koonce ran from the 
store and got back into Koonce’s car, where 
applicant stated that he had shot the man in 
the booth. The men 12 fled the scene. Koonce 
drove back to Nolan’s house to drop 
applicant off and to allow Pradia to retrieve 
his car. The men then split up. Applicant 
spent the night of the offense at Nolan’s 
house. 
 
Witnesses provided a license-plate number 
and descriptions of the getaway vehicle and 
perpetrators, which quickly led Houston 
Police Department (HPD) homicide 
detectives to arrest Koonce. While searching 
Koonce’s vehicle, officers discovered 
Pradia’s wallet and identification, which 
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Pradia had inadvertently left behind. 
Following Koonce’s arrest, Pradia turned 
himself in. Based on information in Koonce’s 
and Pradia’s statements, detectives obtained 
a warrant for applicant’s arrest. During a 
consensual search of Nolan’s house, 
investigators found a shotgun hidden 
between the mattress and box springs of 
applicant’s bed. 
 
Applicant, who left Houston on the day after 
Koonce gave his statement, remained at 
large. HPD detectives were unable to 
ascertain applicant’s whereabouts until May 
2, 1980, when they received a tip that he 
could be found at his grandmother’s 
residence in Louisiana. On May 5, 1980, ten 
days after the offense, Louisiana authorities 
arrested applicant at his grandmother’s house 
pursuant to a fugitive warrant. Incident to the 
arrest, Louisiana officers discovered a small 
suitcase containing a pistol and $612 in cash. 
Applicant, who previously had a full head of 
hair, had shaved his hair down to the scalp. 
 
HPD detectives traveled to Louisiana, took 
applicant into custody, and returned him to 
Houston. In Houston, applicant gave a 
written statement in which he admitted to 
participating in the robbery and to killing 
McCarble, although he asserted that 
McCarble’s death was accidental. According 
to applicant, during the screaming and 13 
panic that ensued after Scott cried out, he 
“suddenly fell backwards and the butt of the 
gun hit [his] arm and the gun went off.” 
Applicant claimed that he later learned that 
the man in the booth had been shot. Applicant 
“[swore that he] was not trying to kill the old 
man and the whole thing was a[n] accident.” 
 
Applicant testified twice at his trial, first at a 
hearing on his motion to suppress his 
statement and later during the defense’s guilt-
innocence case-in-chief. The State 
crossexamined applicant on both occasions. 
At the suppression hearing, applicant denied 
giving or signing the statement. He asserted 
that one or more of the interrogating officers 
had beaten him when he refused to cooperate. 
Although he acknowledged that his signature 
was on the statement, applicant argued that 
his interrogators must have traced it from a 
blank piece of paper that he signed after being 
told that he would be released if he did so. 
 
When he later testified in front of the jury, 
applicant again denied giving or signing the 
statement. Applicant testified that he was 
“quite sure” that someone who had been to 
prison before (as he had) would know better 
than to sign a confession. Applicant also 
denied any involvement in the offense, 
asserting that he was in Louisiana when the 
robbery and McCarble’s death occurred. 
Applicant’s eldest sister, Clara Jean Baker, 
also testified for the defense and corroborated 
applicant’s alibi. 
 
With the third perpetrator’s identity at issue, 
the State presented rebuttal evidence that 
applicant had committed robberies at two 
other grocery stores just days before 
McCarble’s murder. The earlier robberies 
occurred in a similar manner to the robbery 
in which McCarble died, with applicant 
wielding a shotgun and guarding the stores’ 
courtesy booths while accomplices took 
money. 
 
The jury found applicant guilty of capital 
murder. At the punishment phase, pursuant to 
applicant’s stipulation, the State introduced 
his penitentiary packet. The penitentiary 
packet showed that applicant had four 1977 
felony convictions (three for burglary of a 
habitation with the intent to commit theft and 
one for aggravated robbery) for offenses he 
committed in December 1976 and January 
1977. Before accepting the stipulation, the 
trial court questioned applicant directly to 
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determine whether his stipulation was 
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. 
 
Applicant’s trial counsel did not call any 
witnesses or present any evidence at the 
punishment phase. Based on the jury’s 
answers to the special issues, the trial court 
sentenced applicant to death. 
 
B. Applicant’s Initial Direct Appeal 
 
The trial court appointed Richard Bonner, 
one of applicant’s trial counsel, to represent 
applicant on direct appeal. After receiving 
multiple extensions of time, Bonner filed an 
appellate brief for applicant in July 1983. 
 
Between October 1980 and July 1983, the 
trial court and this Court received numerous 
pro se motions and pleadings from applicant. 
The documents concerned applicant’s desire 
to participate in his appeal; need for access to 
the record; growing displeasure with 
Bonner’s appellate representation; and 
dissatisfaction with the trial court’s failure to 
appoint another attorney or to allow applicant 
to represent himself on appeal pursuant to 
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). In 
October 1983, applicant’s dissatisfaction 
culminated with his filing of a pro se petition 
for a writ of mandamus, in which he asked us 
to require the trial court to dismiss Bonner 
and to allow applicant to represent himself on 
appeal. 
 
We remanded the case to the trial court for a 
Faretta hearing, which the trial court held on 
November 2, 1983. George L. Walker, the 
1980 trial judge, presided. Applicant 
advocated on his own behalf and presented 
five exhibits in support of his request to 
proceed pro se. Applicant’s exhibits, which 
were admitted into evidence, included letters 
that he had written to Bonner regarding the 
appeal. At the hearing, applicant read several 
of those letters aloud without any apparent 
difficulty. When it became evident that 
applicant was unaware that Bonner had filed 
a brief, the trial court recessed the hearing for 
an hour to allow applicant to review the 
pleading. When the hearing resumed, the trial 
court questioned applicant to ascertain 
whether he understood and was satisfied with 
the legal issues that Bonner had raised. 
Applicant responded rationally and 
coherently, although he struggled somewhat 
to explain Bonner’s legal arguments to the 
trial court. At the hearing’s conclusion, after 
applicant reaffirmed that he was willing to 
accept new appellate counsel, the trial court 
allowed Bonner to withdraw and appointed 
John H. Ward. After considering the claims 
raised by Bonner and Ward, as well as claims 
raised by applicant in a “Supplemental Pro-
Se Brief for the Appellant,” filed-stamped 
February 26, 1985, we affirmed the 
conviction and sentence. The trial court set 
applicant’s execution for February 26, 1986. 
 
C. Applicant’s Previous State and Federal 
Habeas Proceedings 
 
In February 1986, the Supreme Court denied 
applicant’s out-of-time petition for a writ of 
certiorari and application for a stay of 
execution filed through new appellate 
counsel, Carolyn Garcia. We subsequently 
denied applicant leave to file an application 
for an original writ of habeas corpus, denied 
his first application for a writ of habeas 
corpus filed pursuant to Article 11.07, and 
denied his accompanying motion for a stay of 
execution. 
  
After we denied the motion for stay of 
execution, applicant’s counsel filed a petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus and motion for a 
stay of execution in federal district court. The 
federal district court granted a stay. In June 
1987, after determining that applicant’s 
petition contained an unexhausted claim, the 
federal district court dismissed applicant’s 
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petition without prejudice to refiling upon 
exhaustion of the claim in state court.  
 
On April 6, 1992, now represented by 
attorneys Rick G. Strange, Richard R. 
Fletcher, and Kristi Franklin Hyatt, applicant 
filed his second Article 11.07 application. In 
relevant part, applicant alleged that trial 
counsel rendered ineffective assistance by 
pursuing an alibi defense and, in furtherance 
of that defense, persuading applicant and his 
sister, Clara Jean Baker, to perjure 
themselves at the 1980 trial. Applicant 
further alleged that trial counsel were 
ineffective for failing to investigate, discover, 
and present mitigating evidence at the 
punishment phase. Relying in part on Penry 
v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), which the 
Supreme Court decided after his federal 
habeas petition’s dismissal, applicant for the 
first time alleged that trial counsel should 
have discovered and presented evidence that 
he experienced a troubled childhood, as well 
as evidence that his intellectual functioning 
fell in the intellectually disabled or borderline 
range. To support the allegations, habeas 
counsel attached some of applicant’s school 
and prison records, as well as affidavits 
executed in 1992 by three of applicant’s 
siblings (Clara Jean Baker, Colleen 
McNeese, and Ronnie Moore) and 
applicant’s brother-in-law, Larry Baker. 
 
The school records attached to applicant’s 
1992 writ application included his academic, 
attendance, and cumulative health records, as 
well as scores that he obtained on the Iowa 
Test of Basic Skills (ITBS) given in third 
through sixth grades. The records also 
included the report of applicant’s 1965 pre-
kindergarten school medical examination. 
The examining doctor recommended 
psychological testing, commenting, “Child is 
very withdrawn—maybe retarded but most 
likely emotional problems.” 
 
The school records additionally included two 
IQ scores. In 1971, when he was twelve years 
old and in fifth grade, applicant obtained an 
IQ score of 77 on an Otis Lennon Mental 
Abilities Test (OLMAT). When he was 
thirteen years old and in sixth grade, 
applicant was referred to Marcelle Tucker, 
M.Ed., for a psychological evaluation 
because he was performing below grade 
level, was withdrawn, and took no part in 
class unless called upon. In her report, Tucker 
stated that, on January 24, 1973, she gave 
applicant a Wechsler Intelligence Test for 
Children (WISC) and two tests of perceptual-
motor coordination, specifically, a Bender 
Visual Motor Gestalt (Bender Gestalt) test 
and a Goodenough Draw-a- Man test. Tucker 
reported that applicant obtained a full scale 
IQ score 15 of 78 on the WISC and “mental 
age” scores of eight years, eleven months on 
the Bender Gestalt and nine years, six months 
on the Goodenough.  
 
Tucker noted in her report that applicant was 
then attending his third elementary school. In 
describing applicant’s appearance and test 
behavior, Tucker described him as “nice 
looking” and “neatly dressed - very up-tight - 
did not use left hand even to hold paper when 
it skidded.” In remarks concerning 
applicant’s test results, Tucker again noted 
his test behavior: “During testing, [applicant] 
was extremely controlled. He made only the 
barest minimum of movements. His answers 
were given in as few words as possible.” 
Tucker continued:  
 
The disparity between [the] 
“Information” (4) and 
“Comprehension” (8) [subtests] on 
the WISC indicated that perhaps this 
is a child who has not been taught, but 
who can learn. 
 
Low scores on the Bender and 
Goodenough [tests] seem to be 
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negated by the average scores on 
“Block Design” (9) and “Object 
Assembly” (9) [subtests] on the 
WISC. 
 
Tucker recommended that applicant stay in 
regular classes, but suggested that the school 
modify his program by using certain specific 
teaching techniques to strengthen his areas of 
academic weakness. 
 
The Texas Department of Criminal Justice 
(TDCJ) records attached to applicant’s 1992 
writ application included a February 28, 1984 
report of applicant’s psychological 
evaluation by psychologist George Wheat. 
Wheat stated that he was conducting the 
review at the request of the Psychological 
Screening Committee to assist it with 
determining applicant’s work-capable status. 
Wheat stated that applicant self-reported 16 
“fairly regular [past] employment as [a] 
construction laborer and clothing sales 
clerk.” Wheat also noted that applicant was 
neatly dressed and exhibited no hesitancy in 
answering questions. He stated that 
applicant’s responses “were appropriate to 
his 9th grade educational level and indicated 
[an estimated full scale] IQ of 71.” Wheat 
concluded that applicant was workcapable. 
 
The TDCJ records attached to applicant’s 
1992 application also showed that, in January 
1989, following an internal quality-assurance 
audit, applicant was given a complete WAIS-
R by a TDCJ psychologist. Applicant, who 
was thirty years old at the time, obtained a 
full scale IQ score that was reported as “not 
[falling within the] retarded range.” The 
record currently before us shows that 
applicant obtained a full scale IQ score of 74 
on the 1989 WAIS-R. 
 
The habeas court held an evidentiary hearing 
on April 23, 1993, to address applicant’s 
ineffective-assistance allegations. Judge Carl 
Walker Jr. presided. Dr. Robert J. Borda, a 
clinical neuro-psychologist, reviewed 
applicant’s school and TDCJ records and 
testified for applicant. Borda stated that 
applicant’s scores on the 1973 WISC and 
1989 WAIS-R fell within the borderline 
range of intelligence (70–79) but asserted 
that applicant’s “mental age” at the time of 
the offense was no greater than fourteen 
years. Borda further asserted that applicant’s 
failure to reach for falling papers during 
Tucker’s 1973 WISC testing was unusual and 
consistent with behavior sometimes seen in 
brain-injured people. However, Borda 
acknowledged that the records he reviewed 
did not mention a head injury. 
 
Despite his opinions regarding applicant’s 
mental age at the time of the offense, Borda 
did not purport to diagnose applicant as 
intellectually disabled. Borda testified that IQ 
tests were developed to measure a person’s 
potential to succeed in an academic setting 
and acknowledged that someone who 
obtained IQ scores in the borderline range of 
intelligence might well be capable of 
functioning successfully in the everyday 
world. On crossexamination, the State asked 
Borda whether applicant was capable of 
formulating complex arguments concerning 
his trial representation. Borda testified that, 
based on the documents he had reviewed, he 
“[saw] nothing that would indicate that 
[applicant] has really severe deficits in 
communication skills. I think he’s . . . able to 
communicate adequately.” 
 
Applicant’s sisters, Clara Jean Baker and 
Colleen McNeese, and his brother-in-law, 
Larry Baker, also testified at the 1993 
evidentiary hearing. They testified that 
applicant’s father, Ernest Moore Jr. 
(“Junior”), was a neglectful, physically and 
verbally abusive alcoholic who beat his wife, 
Marion, and their nine children, and threw 
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applicant out of the family home when he was 
fourteen years old. 
 
Clara Jean testified that applicant would 
watch their parents when they fought, which 
was often. Clara Jean asserted that 
applicant’s observation made Junior angry 
and caused him to beat applicant. Clara Jean 
stated that Junior also beat applicant because 
applicant tried to protect the other children. 
 
McNeese asserted that, although Junior beat 
her and her other brothers, he beat applicant 
the most. She testified that Junior threw 
applicant out of the house because applicant 
could not spell and Junior thought he was 
stupid. McNeese stated that, after applicant 
was thrown out of the house, she and her 
siblings would sneak food to him at night 
until Junior discovered what they were doing 
and made them stop. McNeese 
acknowledged that Junior also forced her and 
her other brothers to leave home. 
 
Larry, who lived next to the Moore family as 
a teenager, stated that he had seen Junior 
strike applicant, as well as two of applicant’s 
brothers. Larry testified that he could 
otherwise tell that applicant was suffering 
from some sort of physical abuse because 
applicant had bruises and appeared hungry, 
haggard, and unrested. Larry said that 
applicant was generally secretive about the 
abuse and reluctant to discuss his family 
situation, but he did talk to Larry about it a 
couple of times. 
 
Concerning the allegation that Bonner was 
ineffective as trial counsel by suborning 
perjury, Clara Jean testified that her family 
retained Bonner after learning his name from 
a young woman whom applicant was dating 
at the time. Clara Jean admitted that she lied 
at the 1980 trial when she testified that 
applicant was with her in Louisiana at the 
time of the offense. Clara Jean asserted that 
she lied because Bonner convinced her it was 
necessary for applicant to avoid the death 
penalty and because she wanted to help 
applicant. 
 
Applicant also testified at the 1993 
evidentiary hearing and was cross-examined. 
Regarding the allegation that trial counsel 
suborned perjury, applicant admitted that he 
signed the written statement offered against 
him at the 1980 trial and asserted that the 
statement recounted the offense exactly as it 
happened. Applicant stated that, although he 
also told trial counsel the truth about the 
offense, they advised him to testify at trial 
and deny giving the confession, which he did. 
 
Applicant also testified that, after his arrest, 
he falsely told another inmate that he had a 
cache of jewelry. Applicant surmised that 
trial counsel heard the story because they 
spontaneously asked him if the story were 
true and wanted to know the jewelry’s 
location and worth. Applicant stated that trial 
counsel implied that giving them the jewelry 
could increase his chances of a life sentence. 
To secure a good effort from trial counsel, 
applicant maintained the lie, telling counsel 
that the hidden jewelry was worth close to $1 
million. Applicant initially avoided 
specifying a location for the jewelry by 
telling counsel that he did not think it would 
be a good idea to disclose it to them. 
Eventually, applicant told counsel that the 
jewelry was at his grandmother’s house in 
Louisiana. 
 
Regarding his background, applicant testified 
that his father, Junior, was an alcoholic who 
physically abused him as a child and threw 
him out of the house permanently at age 
fourteen. Applicant stated that he was beaten 
and ejected from the family home because he 
tried to prevent Junior from beating Marion. 
Applicant stated that he needed to find a way 
to survive after Junior permanently threw 
him out of the house. Because it was difficult 
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to simultaneously care for himself and attend 
school, he dropped out and became part of 
“street life.” Applicant testified that he 
frequented pool halls and similar 
establishments; slept in the restroom or back 
of the pool hall; did not immediately try to 
live with anyone else because his siblings 
were helping him without their father’s 
knowledge; obtained food by stealing it from 
stores; and later moved in with a friend. 
 
Applicant testified that school had been 
difficult for him. As a student, he “really 
couldn’t comprehend words as most kids 
would” and “it was difficult for [him] to read 
and write.” Applicant asserted that he still 
had problems with reading and writing, but 
since being imprisoned, he had spent a lot of 
time studying and trying to develop himself. 
As a result, his skills had improved. When 
shown State’s Exhibit 1, a typewritten pro se 
pleading titled, “Supplemental Pro-Se Brief 
For The Appellant,” which was filed-
stamped February 26, 1985, and a 
handwritten cover letter addressed from 
applicant to the Harris County Clerk, 
applicant testified that the brief looked 
familiar to him as a document that someone 
had helped him prepare. He stated that he 
knew the contents and purpose of the 
document and that he had a part in 
researching it. 
 
Bonner testified at the hearing and denied the 
allegations made against him. Bonner stated 
that applicant insisted before and throughout 
trial that he had an alibi and that counsel 
pursue such a defense. Bonner said that he 
spent a great deal of time talking with 
applicant during the course of his trial 
representation and that their conversations 
included discussions of trial strategy. Bonner 
never received the impression that applicant 
failed to understand the gravity of his 
situation or was unable to assist in his own 
defense; Bonner opined that applicant had 
assisted counsel very well. 
 
On August 31, 1993, the habeas court entered 
findings of fact and conclusions of law and 
recommended that we deny relief on 
applicant’s allegations. We determined that 
the record supported the habeas court’s 
findings and conclusions and denied relief.  
Meanwhile, the trial court set applicant’s 
execution date for October 26, 1993. 
 
On October 12, 1993, applicant filed his 
second petition for a writ of habeas corpus in 
federal court, raising the same claims that he 
advanced in his second Article 11.07 writ 
application. He additionally filed a motion 
for stay of execution, which the federal 
district court granted. In 1995, the federal 
district court found that trial counsel 
performed deficiently at both phases of trial, 
but that applicant suffered prejudice only as 
to punishment. In 1999, the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals affirmed the federal district 
court’s determination that applicant was 
entitled to punishment relief.  
 
D. 2001 Punishment Retrial 
 
In February 2001, the trial court held a new 
punishment trial. The current habeas judge, 
Susan Baetz Brown, heard certain pretrial 
matters, but Judge Larry Fuller presided over 
jury selection and the evidentiary portion of 
the punishment retrial. 
 
At trial, the State reintroduced the evidence 
that it had presented at the guilt-innocence 
and punishment phases of applicant’s 1980 
trial. It also introduced applicant’s 
disciplinary reports for the period he was 
confined on death row before his original 
death sentence was vacated. 
 
Those reports showed that, on June 24, 1983, 
after showering, applicant stopped at a cell to 
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talk to another inmate and ignored three 
orders to return to his own cell. After refusing 
the third order, applicant told the reporting 
officer, “[Y]ou can’t tell me what to do, come 
on out from behind those bars and make me 
get in my cell. You aren’t man enough to put 
me down.” During a later security check at 
applicant’s cell, applicant told the officer, 
“[Y]ou get out from in front of my cell, you 
motherfucker, I wish these bars weren’t 
here.” On September 23, 1983, while being 
let out for recreation, applicant stopped at 
four different cells to talk to other inmates 
and ignored eleven orders by the escorting 
guard to proceed. 
 
On January 23, 1984, applicant ignored 
orders to stop talking to another inmate and 
enter the day room. On March 9, 1984, 
applicant failed to report to his assigned 
work. When confronted, applicant falsely 
stated that an officer had given him the day 
off. 
 
On April 18, 1986, applicant was found to 
possess a large quantity of pills for which he 
did not have a prescription. On April 23, 
1986, when ordered to shave, applicant told 
the guard that everyone knew that he had a 
shaving pass. When ordered to show the pass, 
applicant refused. On October 3, 1986, while 
giving inmates their meal, a guard ordered 
applicant to move from a bench in the day 
room to a table. Applicant stood up, stated 
that he “just had to fuck with somebody,” and 
then refused an order to return to his bunk. 
 
On January 3, 1987, applicant refused an 
order to get a haircut, stating, “I’m not going 
to get one.” On January 22, 1987, applicant 
was among a group of inmates brought to the 
day room and told to sit down facing the wall. 
Applicant created a disturbance by jumping 
up and yelling, “[F]uck this, we don’t have to 
do this,” and trying to get the other inmates 
in the day room to join him. When ordered to 
sit, applicant repeated, “No! [W]e don’t have 
to do this!” As the guard approached him, 
applicant returned to the spot where he had 
been sitting but refused to sit down. 
Ultimately, the guard grabbed applicant by 
both arms and placed him face down on the 
day-room floor. 
 
On November 17, 1987, a prescription-only 
pill was found in applicant’s cell, wrapped in 
toilet paper. Applicant did not have a 
prescription for the medication. On June 23, 
1988, applicant refused an order to shave, 
citing a medical condition. 
 
On September 6, 1990, a stinger (an altered 
electrical cord used to boil water) was found 
in applicant’s cell. On August 12, 1992, 
applicant, who was working as a death-row 
porter, refused an order to clean up a spill in 
the main hallway. He stated that it was not his 
job because he was a death-row porter, not a 
hall porter. On March 30, 1995, applicant 
was found to possess matches and rolling 
papers, which inmates were prohibited from 
having. 
 
Applicant did not testify at his punishment 
retrial. However, the defense called nine of 
applicant’s family members to testify about 
applicant’s background and the changes they 
had seen in applicant since he had been 
imprisoned on death row. 
 
Marion Moore, applicant’s mother, testified 
that the family had financial problems. 
She stated that she worked forty hours per 
week outside the home when applicant was 
small and that her husband, Junior, worked 
construction jobs on and off. She testified 
that Junior developed a drinking habit and 
would become frustrated with the children 
when he had been drinking. Marion testified 
that, in December 1971, applicant was hit in 
the head by a brick when he was on a school 
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bus and that he received medical treatment 
for the injury a few days later. 
 
Larry Baker gave testimony similar to that 
which he gave at the 1993 evidentiary 
hearing concerning Junior’s verbal and 
physical abuse of the Moore children. 
Regarding Junior’s verbal abuse, Larry 
elaborated that Junior treated the male Moore 
children differently than the female children. 
Larry stated that Junior would tell all of his 
sons that they were “worthless” and “no 
good.” 
 
When asked to describe what kind of person 
applicant was between the ages of thirteen 
and seventeen, Larry testified that applicant 
was athletic, had a dog and “really had a 
special relationship with it,” and “was a quiet 
kind of guy sometimes.” Larry asserted that 
he had seen changes in applicant since that 
time. Larry stated that he “felt initially that 
[applicant] was not as intelligent as he ha[d] 
displayed lately.” Larry said that applicant 
“shows advance [sic] toward intelligence. He 
reads a lot. His handwriting is excellent. His 
grasp of vocabulary has improved 
considerably. His presentation of himself is 
much better.” 
 
McNeese testified that the Moore family 
moved a lot and that they had been evicted on 
one occasion. As to Junior’s physical abuse 
of applicant, McNeese gave testimony 
similar to that which she gave at the 1993 
evidentiary hearing. She again acknowledged 
that Junior beat all of the children, but 
testified that Junior treated applicant 
differently from her other brothers and said 
that applicant did not seem like he was 
Junior’s son. 
 
McNeese also testified that she and applicant 
attended the same schools when they were 
young. She said that they first attended 
Atherton Elementary, at which the student 
body was predominately black. When 
applicant was about twelve, as part of a racial 
integration effort, they were bussed to 
Scroggins Elementary. McNeese testified 
that “it was really hard for us to attend 
[Scroggins] because the people didn’t want 
us there.” She testified that, when they were 
first attending Scroggins, applicant was hit in 
the head with a brick because the other 
students wanted them off the bus. She said 
that applicant missed school because of the 
brick incident. 
 
McNeese, who is about eleven months 
younger than applicant, testified that she and 
applicant were placed in the same classroom 
at Scroggins so that she could help him. 
McNeese stated that applicant did not 
respond to the teachers, who did not realize 
that he could not read, and he would not 
participate in anything. McNeese attributed 
applicant’s behavior in class to the fact that 
he did not understand what was going on. She 
said that she overheard teachers discussing 
applicant and asking each other whether he 
were intellectually disabled or had a hearing 
problem. McNeese testified that when she 
was doing seventh-grade-level work, the 
teachers would give applicant third-grade-
level work to do, and she would stay after 
class to help applicant with it. 
 
McNeese testified that Hester House, a 
community center serving Houston’s Fifth 
Ward, was a place where she and her siblings 
escaped from their situation. McNeese 
thought that applicant did better at Hester 
House than at school because “[i]t was the 
only place where he could really go without 
my dad messing with him.” McNeese 
testified that applicant learned to swim at 
Hester House, became very good at 
swimming and enjoyed it, entered into 
swimming competitions, and at age thirteen, 
won an award for saving a deaf and mute boy 
from drowning. 
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Paravena Richardson, applicant’s cousin, 
testified that she spent a lot of time in the 
Moore household as a child and attended 
school with applicant and some of his 
siblings. Richardson stated that they first 
attended Atherton Elementary but then were 
bussed to Scroggins Elementary, at which the 
student body was primarily Hispanic. 
Richardson stated that she was in the same 
classes with applicant at Scroggins and that 
the Hispanic students there treated him 
badly—calling him names, picking fights, 
and once hitting applicant in the side of the 
face with a brick. Richardson testified that, as 
a result of his treatment by the Hispanic 
students, applicant was withdrawn in class 
and kept to himself. 
 
Richardson said that she had seen Junior, 
who was quite controlling and could be set 
off by the most minute things, become 
physically violent with his children. 
Richardson stated that Junior targeted 
applicant more than the other boys. 
Richardson did not know why and noted that 
Junior and applicant’s older brother, Charles, 
had almost as poor a relationship. 
 
Applicant’s brother, Lonnie Moore, testified 
that he was a couple of years younger than 
applicant. When Lonnie was ten years old, he 
attended Scroggins Elementary with 
applicant. Lonnie testified that he and 
applicant were part of a group of students 
who were bussed to Scroggins to integrate it. 
Lonnie was aware at the time of racial 
tensions at Scroggins and of things that 
happened to applicant there. 
 
Lonnie stated that his parents treated him and 
his younger siblings differently than they 
treated the older children. Unlike the older 
children, Lonnie and his younger siblings had 
to stay in the backyard. They were not 
allowed to play out in the streets with friends 
and would be watched over by their eldest 
sibling, Clara Jean. Lonnie testified that 
applicant and his other older brothers were 
not subject to the same restrictions. Lonnie 
saw Junior physically abuse applicant when 
applicant stood up for what he thought was 
right, which included protecting their mother 
from Junior’s abuse. Lonnie testified that, 
due to the tension between applicant and 
Junior, applicant was not comfortable or able 
to relax at home. 
 
Lonnie testified about gifts that applicant had 
made in prison for him, which included: 
clocks in the design of a church and a church 
cross, a jewelry box, and picture frames. 
Lonnie further testified that he had seen a big 
change in applicant since applicant had been 
on death row. Lonnie thought that applicant 
had gained direction and developed 
compassion, and noted that they now talked a 
lot about religion. 
 
Applicant’s brother, Johnny B. Moore, 
testified that he was four years younger than 
applicant. Johnny saw Junior hurt applicant, 
sometimes for no apparent reason, and at 
other times, because applicant was trying to 
stop their parents from fighting. When 
applicant was still living in the family home, 
applicant earned money by cutting grass. 
When the children did not have enough to eat, 
applicant would use his earnings to help feed 
his siblings. 
 
Ronnie Moore, the youngest of applicant’s 
brothers, testified that when their parents 
were gone, the older children—primarily 
applicant, Clara Jean, and McNeese—took 
care of the younger children. Ronnie stated 
that there was often no food in the house. On 
one occasion when applicant and McNeese 
were in charge of the younger children and 
there was no food, Ronnie saw applicant and 
McNeese eating from the neighbors’ trash 
cans. He recalled that they contracted food 
poisoning. 
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Ronnie further testified that applicant worked 
on the weekends for a man named Collier, 
who mowed lawns, and that applicant also 
worked in a rest home. Ronnie testified that 
applicant used his earnings to help support 
the family. Applicant gave Ronnie money for 
lunch and their mother money for bills. 
Ronnie testified that, in addition to beating 
applicant, Junior would call applicant 
“stupid” and “dummy.” 
 
Cloteal Morris, applicant’s mother’s cousin, 
testified that applicant was quiet and well 
behaved as a young boy, but he was not an 
open child and never talked very much. She 
stated that applicant had written her beautiful 
letters from prison about church and religion. 
Alice Moore, applicant’s maternal aunt, 
testified that applicant was quiet as a child 
and “seemed like a regular kid.” She stated 
that applicant wrote letters to her from prison 
and described them as “just normal letters.” 
 
The defense also called Jo Ann Cross, a 
London solicitor. Cross became acquainted 
with applicant through her mother, who 
began corresponding with applicant in 1990. 
Cross began corresponding with applicant in 
1993. Cross testified that applicant’s writing 
style, spelling, grammar, and use of language 
had all improved during the period of their 
correspondence and that it continued to 
improve. 
 
Cross further stated that applicant now 
showed “a greater deal of understanding of 
all sort of issues, be it culture issues [or] 
politics” than he had at the beginning of the 
correspondence. Cross explained that she had 
arranged for applicant to receive newspapers 
and articles and that they had discussed these 
materials in their correspondence. She 
testified that applicant had “absolutely” 
demonstrated an ability to understand and 
comprehend the events that she was 
discussing with him and that he had shown 
sympathy and happiness for her when it was 
appropriate. After her mother died in 1996, 
applicant wrote Cross a very moving letter 
about her mother’s death. Applicant had also 
made and sent gifts for Cross and her mother, 
including a jewelry box with a prayer for 
peace inlaid in the lid and a musical jewelry 
box. 
 
TDCJ guards testified that, while on death 
row, applicant obtained the status of a staff-
support inmate, which allowed him to apply 
for jobs within the prison and enjoy certain 
privileges during his non-working time. 
Applicant’s records showed that he 
successfully applied for jobs as a wing porter 
and barber and that he also worked in the 
shoe and garment factories. 
 
A Harris County Jail guard, Jeff Dixie, 
testified that, while applicant had been in jail 
awaiting the retrial, he had seen applicant 
reading a newspaper. Another Harris County 
jailor, Kenneth Wayne Young, testified that 
he had written a motivational book, “Wakeup 
Call,” and that the chaplain had given a copy 
to applicant. Young testified that applicant 
read “all the time” and that applicant 
introduced newly arrived or troubled jail 
inmates to Young’s book. 
 
The defense also called two expert witnesses 
to testify, Dee Dee Halpin and Bettina 
Wright. Halpin was an educational 
diagnostician with a master’s degree in 
special education. Wright was a clinical 
social worker who held a bachelor’s degree 
in psychology and a master’s degree in social 
work. 
 
Halpin stated that, at the defense’s request, 
she reviewed applicant’s educational records. 
These records reflected applicant’s 
attendance, conduct and academic grades, 
academic achievement test scores, and IQ test 
results. Halpin testified that applicant 
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attended Atherton Elementary School from 
kindergarten through fourth grade. She stated 
that there was a recommendation during the 
kindergarten year that applicant receive 
psychological testing because he was very 
withdrawn. Although the person who 
recommended testing commented that 
intellectual-disability was a possible cause 
for applicant’s presentation, that person 
thought that emotional problems were the 
more likely explanation.  
 
Halpin testified that applicant was promoted 
to first grade, but he made very poor grades 
that year, especially in all of the language 
areas, he tested “poorly” in reading and math 
readiness, and his eye-hand coordination was 
immature. When applicant was retained a 
year in first grade, his grades remained weak, 
with the only significant change being that 
his conduct grade dropped from “good” to 
“needs improvement.” When applicant was 
socially promoted to second grade at age 
eight, his grades remained about the same. 
Applicant attended summer school and was 
promoted to third grade, where his poor 
grades continued and his conduct dropped to 
“unsatisfactory,” the lowest possible conduct 
grade. Halpin testified that applicant’s score 
that year on the Iowa Test of Basic Skills 
(ITBS), a group-administered standardized 
achievement test, indicated that he was a third 
grader performing at a second-grade level. 
 
Halpin testified that applicant was promoted 
to fourth grade, but his grades remained poor, 
and he continued to perform below grade 
level on the ITBS. He was promoted “on 
appeal” to fifth grade and began attending a 
new school, Scroggins Elementary. 
Applicant’s grades improved from Fs to Ds, 
and his conduct grades for that year showed 
significant improvement. When he took the 
ITBS that year, applicant’s math score was 
within the average range, although his 
language score remained below average. 
When noting applicant’s result on the 
OLMAT that applicant took that year (77 
IQ), Halpin described the OLMAT as a 
group-administered IQ test. 
 
Halpin stated that applicant attended a third 
elementary school for sixth grade. She 
testified that attending three different schools 
within three years would be difficult for any 
child. Halpin explained that, in the era in 
which applicant attended school, the grade in 
which certain skills were taught often varied 
between schools. As a result, a student who 
changed schools frequently in that era might 
miss being taught certain skills. In addition, 
changing schools disrupted continuity in a 
child’s learning and required the student to 
make a social adjustment to the new 
environment. 
 
Halpin stated that applicant’s ITBS scores for 
sixth grade showed him to be performing two 
years below grade level. Applicant’s records 
also showed that he took a Slosson 
Intelligence Test that year, at age thirteen. 
Halpin testified that 26 applicant “came out 
with a mental age of seven-and-a half and so 
his IQ was 57,” which fell within the 
intellectually disabled range. But Halpin 
noted that the Slosson is an individually 
administered IQ test that strongly favors 
verbal skills. She asserted that a student with 
any kind of language difficulty would 
typically perform poorly on the Slosson and 
that applicant had consistently shown such 
language difficulties. In addition, Halpin 
testified that a notation in applicant’s records 
stated that his Slosson IQ score of 57 was 
“minimal.” Halpin explained that a 
“minimal” notation typically meant that the 
test administrator felt that the person actually 
functioned at a higher level. 
 
Halpin was additionally skeptical of 
applicant’s score on the Slosson because he 
subsequently took the individually 
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administered WISC, which separately 
assessed verbal and nonverbal abilities. 
Within the overall IQ score of 78 that 
applicant obtained on the WISC, he obtained 
a verbal IQ score of 77 and a nonverbal or 
performance IQ score of 83. Halpin testified 
that, according to his school records, 
applicant remained in a regular classroom 
following the WISC testing. 
 
Halpin testified that she had also reviewed a 
letter that applicant had recently written. 
She stated that, although the letter contained 
some errors, the language was “certainly 
coherent,” “fairly complex,” and “adult[-
]like.” Based on all the materials she 
reviewed, Halpin opined that applicant 
functioned in the low-average range of 
intellectual functioning and that he 
“definitely had some ability to learn that 
wasn’t tapped early in his school years.” 
 
Wright testified that she had reviewed 
applicant’s educational records and Dr. 
Borda’s 1993 evidentiary hearing testimony. 
She also interviewed applicant twice, for a 
total of four hours. Wright concluded that 
applicant “was nowhere near retarded.” She 
opined that applicant had an average IQ and 
that his ability to learn was “very intact.” 
 
Wright attributed applicant’s difficulties in 
school to undiagnosed learning disabilities 
and emotional problems. She opined that his 
emotional problems stemmed from his 
learning disabilities, academic failure, and 
self-described “scary” childhood. She 
concluded that the quietness and constrained 
movement noted in applicant’s records were 
due to his fear rather than to any diminished 
intellectual functioning. She explained that 
applicant was a very vigilant and watchful 
child who carefully assessed situations before 
acting. 
 
Wright testified that applicant’s drug use 
exacerbated his difficulties in school. 
Applicant told Wright that he began to use 
drugs in fifth grade to “escape the pain.” He 
began by using marijuana. By the time he was 
of junior-high and high-school age, Wright 
testified, applicant was using marijuana, 
alcohol, amphetamines, tranquilizers, and 
whatever else he could obtain. 
 
In closing argument, defense counsel 
emphasized applicant’s background. Defense 
counsel asserted that applicant did so poorly 
in school that he “was considered to be 
possibly [intellectually disabled].” But 
counsel asserted that “we learned later from 
the experts and other people who looked at 
[applicant’s school records] that he wasn’t 
really [intellectually disabled] at all, he was 
capable of learning.” Counsel argued that 
“mostly what [applicant’s] young life was 
about” was “lack of food, violence in the 
home[,] and one failure after another in 
school. . . . It was a cycle of violence in which 
there was no peace and no safety in the 
home.” Counsel asserted that, in addition to 
physically abusing applicant, Junior Moore 
emotionally abused applicant by conveying 
the idea that he “wasn’t any good, he wasn’t 
smart, [and] he couldn’t learn.” Counsel 
argued that applicant “[was] not retarded, he 
was just treated like somebody that was 
retarded” and that it was not until applicant 
“[went] to prison[,] away from his family 
environment that [he was] actually safe 
enough to be able to learn and grow and 
become the kind of person that he could have 
become had he come from a safe 
environment.” 
 
The trial court charged the jury pursuant to 
Article 37.0711. On February 14, 2001, in 
accordance with the jury’s answers to the 
special issues, the trial court again sentenced 
applicant to death. 
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E. Direct Appeal from 2001 Punishment 
Retrial 
 
Robert Morrow, applicant’s punishment-
retrial counsel, also represented applicant on 
the automatic direct appeal to this Court. See 
Art. 37.0711, § 3(g). On August 20, 2002, 
Morrow filed a brief on applicant’s behalf. 
On the same date, he filed “Appellant’s 
Motion To Stay Proceedings Under [Atkins] 
Pending Legislative Action, As An 
Alternative To Relief Requested In 
Appellant’s Brief.” Despite having argued at 
the punishment retrial that applicant was not 
intellectually disabled and having presented 
the testimony of two experts to support that 
theory, Morrow now asserted that applicant 
“ha[d] a strong claim of [intellectual-
disability]” under the June 2002 Supreme 
Court opinion in Atkins. Morrow urged us to 
stay applicant’s direct appeal until the Texas 
Legislature enacted legislation to implement 
Atkins’s mandate. We denied the motion on 
September 11, 2002. 
 
On October 3, 2002, applicant filed a pro se 
“Motion for Leave to File Appellant’s [Pro 
Se] Supplemental Brief.” In the motion, 
applicant acknowledged that he was not 
entitled to hybrid representation, but stated 
that he wished to file a supplemental pro se 
brief to raise an additional point of error. In 
his pro se supplemental brief, applicant 
argued that Article 37.0711 was 
unconstitutional because it implicitly placed 
the burden on the defendant to show that 
sufficient mitigating factors exist to warrant 
a life sentence rather than death. We denied 
applicant’s motion on October 4, 2002, and 
later affirmed his sentence.  
 
II. Current Habeas Proceedings 
 
A. Applicant’s Application and Supporting 
Exhibits 
 
On June 17, 2003, through appointed habeas 
counsel Stephen Morris, applicant filed his 
current application pursuant to Article 
11.071. In support of his request for an 
evidentiary hearing on his Atkins claim, 
applicant attached affidavits executed in 
2003 by Gina Vitale, a social worker and his 
mitigation investigator, and Dr. Richard 
Garnett, a clinical psychologist. Vitale and 
Garnett each asserted that there was 
sufficient evidence of applicant’s 
intellectual-disability, as defined in the tenth 
(2002) edition of the AAMR Manual or the 
DSM-IV, or both, to warrant an evidentiary 
hearing. According to their affidavits, 
although Vitale interviewed applicant’s 
relatives, neither Vitale nor Garnett 
personally assessed applicant. Instead, they 
based their opinions on their review of 
Vitale’s interviews with applicant’s family; 
affidavits and interview notes compiled by 
applicant’s previous defense team; and some 
of applicant’s records. Neither Vitale nor 
Garnett actually diagnosed applicant as 
intellectually disabled. 
 
Vitale discounted applicant’s 77 IQ score on 
the OLMAT, describing that instrument as a 
state-mandated, group-administered IQ 
screening tool, and she emphasized the 57 IQ 
score that he obtained on the Slosson. Vitale 
acknowledged applicant’s WISC score (78 
IQ), but asserted that his mental age scores on 
the concurrently administered Bender Gestalt 
and Goodenough tests reflected much lower 
IQ scores of 67 and 71, respectively. 
 
Garnett stated that the OLMAT is a group test 
that requires one to read. Due to evidence of 
applicant’s inability to read, Garnett 
questioned the validity of applicant’s 
OLMAT score. Garnett also asserted that 
applicant obtained a 67 IQ score on the 
Bender Gestalt and a 72 IQ score on the 
Goodenough test that he took in conjunction 
with the 1973 WISC. 
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B. Applicant’s Pro Se Requests to Waive 
Further Appeals 
 
The State filed an original answer in 
December 2003, followed by a supplemental 
answer in January 2004. On June 23, 2005, 
direct appeal counsel Morrow wrote to the 
current habeas judge, stating: 
 
It is my understanding that you 
recently received a request from 
[applicant] to discontinue his appeals 
and or [sic] pending writs. I received 
the same request. However, 
immediately after that, I received 
instruction from [applicant] that he no 
longer wishes to withdraw his writs or 
appeals. [Applicant] is dealing with 
the stress of Death Row and was 
understandably upset when he wrote 
the first letter. [Applicant] wants to 
continue his post-conviction efforts. 
 
Despite Morrow’s assertions, on October 3, 
2005, applicant filed a “Pro Se Ex Parte 
Motion to Waive Further Appeal” in the trial 
court. Applicant correctly stated that he had 
been sentenced to death on February 14, 
2001, after a new punishment trial; that the 
trial court had subsequently appointed 
Morrow to represent him on direct appeal; 
and that it had appointed Morris to prepare a 
post-conviction application for a writ of 
habeas corpus. Applicant moved the trial 
court to dismiss Morrow and Morris, to find 
that he waived further appeals of his capital-
murder conviction and death sentence, and to 
set his execution date. 
 
On May 30, 2006, the current habeas judge 
held a hearing concerning applicant’s pro se 
motion. Direct-appeal counsel Morrow 
appeared on behalf of applicant, who, by the 
parties’ agreement, was not present. The 
court stated that, in response to applicant’s 
2005 letter and motion, it had ordered him 
moved from death row to the Harris County 
Jail for a psychological examination to 
determine his competency to withdraw his 
application. The court further stated that, as 
of the 2006 hearing date, applicant had been 
at the jail for sixty-nine days but had refused 
to speak with doctors. Therefore, the court 
said, no psychological examination could be 
completed. Counsel for both parties agreed to 
the court’s factual recitation. Because no 
psychological examination could be 
completed, the court ordered applicant’s 
habeas proceeding to continue, directed that 
he be returned to death row, and instructed 
Morrow to write to applicant to explain why 
the court could not proceed with the pro se 
motion. 
 
C. Applicant’s Supplemental Filings in 
Support of His Atkins Claim 
 
In 2009, current writ counsel, Pat McCann, 
substituted for Morris, who was permitted to 
withdraw. In late 2011, McCann filed a 
lengthy “Factual Supplement” in support of 
applicant’s Atkins allegation. The Factual 
Supplement included documents that 
appeared to be notes taken by applicant’s 
1992 writ and 2001 punishment-retrial 
defense-team members, specifically, Kristi 
Franklin Hyatt, Anthony S. Haughton, 
Patrick Moran, and Jemma Levinson. The 
notes memorialized their interviews with 
applicant, various relatives, and Dr. Borda. 
 
According to those notes, on November 14, 
1991, applicant told Haughton that Junior 
Moore physically terrorized and abused 
applicant’s mother and siblings just as badly 
as he did applicant; applicant was a slow 
learner who did not do well in school; and 
due to family moves and racial integration 
efforts, he attended several different schools. 
Applicant said that, when he dropped out of 
school around age fifteen or sixteen, he could 
barely read and started living “a street life.” 
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He had his first drink at age thirteen, and 
before going to prison at age seventeen, he 
regularly abused alcohol and drugs. In junior-
high school, he started smoking marijuana 
and taking 7 to 14 Quaalude pills per day, and 
he tried methamphetamine. Applicant also 
reported that, after his first stint in prison, he 
started cooking and injecting “preludes.” 
Applicant stated that he got stoned regularly, 
often combining preludes, marijuana, and 
alcohol. 
 
According to the notes, in April 1993 (i.e., 
before the 1993 evidentiary hearing), Borda 
told Hyatt that he did not consider applicant 
intellectually disabled, although he believed 
that physical abuse, neglect, and substance 
abuse may have affected applicant’s mental 
status at the time of the offense. Because 
applicant had never been tested for a 
personality disorder, Borda told Hyatt that he 
could not rule out schizophrenia or 
personality disorders. However, Borda said 
that he felt comfortable describing applicant 
as having at least below average intelligence, 
a learning disorder, and compromised social 
development. Borda believed that applicant 
had some sort of brain dysfunction, possibly 
from a frontallobe injury, which would result 
in a lack of impulse control and a diminished 
ability to think through the consequences of 
his actions. But Borda acknowledged to 
Hyatt that amphetamine abuse could cause 
“this personality defect.” 
 
The notes in applicant’s Factual Supplement 
indicated that defense-team members 
interviewed applicant four times in 2000. 
Moran interviewed applicant in February and 
March of that year. During the interviews, 
applicant stated that his mother, Marion, 
would send him to look for Junior, who was 
often absent. Applicant would usually find 
Junior drunk and with another woman. 
Applicant observed that it probably angered 
Junior for applicant to find him in such a 
compromising position and that Junior may 
have beaten applicant harder than the other 
children to deter him from telling Marion. 
 
Applicant stated that, after being 
permanently thrown out of the house, he 
could have stayed with nearby friends. But 
because applicant felt ashamed, he instead 
spent the first night in a neighbor’s garage. 
 
Applicant said that his earlier period of 
incarceration would show two disciplinary 
matters. One was for making gambling dice 
from paper and soap. The other was for 
fighting a bullying inmate named “Cadillac.” 
Applicant recalled that he had been in the day 
room talking to an inmate who was known as 
an easy rape victim. When Cadillac began 
taunting both of them, a fight ensued. 
Applicant said that a guard who witnessed the 
incident corroborated his assertion of self-
defense. 
 
Jemma Levinson interviewed applicant twice 
in May 2000. According to her notes, 
applicant stated that he looked after his older 
brother, Charles, who sometimes got into 
trouble when drinking, and that he broke up 
fights between Charles and their brother 
Jessie. Applicant also said that it fell to him 
and his sister, Clara Jean, to look after the 
younger siblings. At school, applicant’s 
sister, Colleen, told him that a boy was 
bothering her. Applicant told the boy to leave 
Colleen alone and fought with him. 
 
Applicant described himself to Levinson as 
the kid in the neighborhood that everyone 
liked and recalled that he would clean houses 
and cut yards. Applicant told Levinson that, 
when he was around eleven or twelve years 
old, he would sneak out of the house between 
1:00 and 2:00 a.m. to see friends. Applicant 
said that he lacked guidance and became 
attracted to “things on the street.” 
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Applicant also stated that he did not do well 
in school, did not like it, and was frustrated 
by his inability to read or write. To escape 
class, at first he would go to the school nurse, 
pretending to be sick. He started skipping 
school in fourth grade, skipped school a few 
times in sixth grade, and by seventh grade, 
almost entirely stopped going. Applicant told 
Levinson that he also started drinking in the 
seventh grade. 
 
Applicant reported that, in seventh grade, he 
wanted to be a football or baseball player and 
tried out for school sports teams, but he had 
to stop playing when he ran over a wire 
hanger while mowing lawns and suffered a 
cut to his leg. The hospital put a cast on his 
leg, which he ultimately removed himself 
because he was determined to walk on his 
leg. Applicant said that he met his first 
girlfriend at school and that he would sneak 
from his house at night to see her. Applicant 
stated that he got into trouble at school for 
fighting and had a reputation for it, such that 
people wanted to fight with him. Applicant 
thought that the fights came about because he 
was shy and did not know how to 
communicate. 
 
Applicant also told Levinson that he began 
hanging around the pool hall, where he 
learned to gamble and steal. Another guy 
around his same age showed him how to 
shoot pool, rob people, steal cars, and break 
into houses. Applicant told Levinson that he 
later began doing those things on his own. 
 
Applicant further stated that he started 
injecting preludes when he was between 
fifteen and sixteen years old, but he later 
stopped because it scared him, and he knew 
that he would end up dead or doing 
something that he would regret. Applicant 
also stopped drinking alcohol after seeing the 
effect it had on him, but he continued 
smoking marijuana. Applicant reported that 
he paid for drugs with money that he made 
from stealing and selling cars, breaking into 
houses, and hustling pool. 
 
Applicant also told Levinson that during his 
earlier period of incarceration, he made 
friends with an inmate named Swan. 
Applicant and Swan would stay out of the day 
room to avoid the fights that frequently 
occurred there. Instead, he and Swan would 
play dominoes elsewhere and applicant had a 
disciplinary report for one of those occasions. 
Applicant recalled that, around 1997, he went 
through “a bad period” on death row, during 
which all he did was sleep and gain weight. 
Applicant further told Levinson that he had 
ordered and read a book written by a jail 
officer. 
 
The notes contained in applicant’s Factual 
Supplement indicate that Moran and 
Levinson separately interviewed Clara Jean 
Baker in 2000. According to those notes, 
Clara Jean reported that both of applicant’s 
parents regularly beat all of the children 
except for her. Clara Jean recalled that, as 
applicant grew older, he would intervene 
when his parents fought, causing Junior to 
throw him out. Clara Jean said that applicant 
knew about Junior’s many extramarital 
affairs and that Junior was always angry with 
applicant for catching him in infidelity. Clara 
Jean further stated that applicant and their 
brother, Jessie, would sneak out of the house. 
In his early years, applicant was quiet, shy, 
and did not spend much time with other 
people, but otherwise was happy, artistic, and 
always working. In summer, applicant would 
cut yards all day until Marion came home. 
Applicant liked wearing nice things and 
cared a lot about his appearance. Clara Jean 
recalled that applicant had a girlfriend at 
school named Robin, who was “very cute,” 
and other boys envied him because of it. 
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The notes also indicate that Levinson 
interviewed Larry Baker in 2000. Larry 
reported that, as a child, applicant was 
“personable and impressionable, . . . a very 
good athlete,” liked animals, was obedient, 
attended school, and “was just the same as the 
rest of us.” Applicant trained the Moore 
family’s dog and put on “shows” with the 
animal. The dog was very well trained and 
did whatever applicant said. Larry recalled 
that applicant followed clothing trends, was 
pleasant and well-mannered, and was always 
helpful, doing odd jobs and selling 
newspapers. He described applicant as 
enterprising and having a lot of friends. As 
they grew older, Larry started noticing 
changes in applicant’s choice of associates 
and in applicant’s attitude towards attaining 
things. Larry stated that applicant developed 
the attitude that he did not want to work his 
whole life and have nothing. Larry told 
Levinson that applicant always looked neat 
and tidy, had good hygiene, and worked in a 
fish market and cut grass to buy his clothes. 
 
D. Appointment of Mental-health Experts 
 
The current habeas court appointed mental-
health experts for both parties in anticipation 
of the 2014 evidentiary hearing. Dr. Borda 
again assisted applicant, as did Dr. Shawanda 
Williams Anderson, a clinical neuro-
psychologist, and Dr. Stephen Greenspan, a 
retired professor of educational psychology. 
Dr. Kristi Compton, a clinical and forensic 
psychologist, assisted the State. Before the 
hearing, habeas counsel filed Borda’s 
affidavit and Anderson’s “Forensic 
Neuropsychological Report.” 
 
According to her report, on November 22, 
2013, and December 6, 2013, over a period 
of four hours, Anderson conducted an initial 
diagnostic interview of applicant at TDCJ’s 
Polunsky Unit and administered various 
neuropsychological tests to him. She 
thereafter interviewed applicant’s family 
members for approximately two hours. On 
December 19, 2013, Anderson administered 
math subtests of the WAIS-IV and Wide 
Range Achievement Test-4 (WRAT-4) to 
applicant at the Harris County Jail, solely to 
determine his computational ability. 
 
According to Borda’s affidavit, he 
administered “a very limited test battery” to 
applicant on December 12, 2013. That 
battery consisted of three neuropsychological 
tests and one formal measure of IQ, a 
Raven’s Colored Progressive Matrices 
(RCPM) test. Applicant obtained an IQ score 
of 85 on the RCPM. 
 
On January 1, 2014, Compton conducted a 
six-hour assessment of applicant. After 
interviewing applicant about his personal 
history, she administered a Test of Memory 
Malingering (TOMM); a WAIS–IV; a 
Wechsler Memory Scales, 4th Edition; a 
complete WRAT-4; and a Texas Functional 
Living Scales, a test of adaptive functioning. 
Applicant obtained a full scale IQ score of 59 
on the WAIS-IV. 
 
E. January 2014 Evidentiary Hearing 
 
Lonnie Moore, Colleen McNeese, Larry 
Baker, Mark Fronkiewicz, Borda, 
Greenspan, and Anderson testified for 
applicant at the 2014 evidentiary hearing. 
Through applicant’s relatives, applicant 
again presented evidence of Junior’s 
alcoholism and physical abuse, the family’s 
limited financial means, and applicant’s poor 
grades and reading difficulties. 
 
Lonnie Moore testified that applicant was 
shy, quiet, and athletically talented as a child, 
especially at swimming, but he received poor 
grades in school and never read well. While 
still living with the family, applicant made 
money in the summer by cutting grass and 
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helping a man with household projects. After 
being thrown out of the house, applicant 
worked at the Galleria for a place that sold 
sausages. 
 
Lonnie and McNeese testified that their 
mother, Marion, cooked the family’s meals 
on a hot plate and that the family did not have 
kitchen appliances such as a microwave 
oven. McNeese asserted that applicant did 
not know how to cook and did not help 
prepare food. However, McNeese and Lonnie 
both testified that only the female children 
were enlisted to help Marion with meal 
preparation. 
 
McNeese had testified at applicant’s 1993 
evidentiary hearing and his 2001 punishment 
retrial. She now remembered that the incident 
on the school bus, in which applicant was hit 
in the head with a brick, was a much more 
violent event than she had described in her 
prior testimony, asserting that it involved the 
bus being set on fire with Malotov-cocktail-
like devices. McNeese also now remembered 
that, when applicant was in second and third 
grade, he could not tell a $1 bill from a $5 or 
$10 bill, was not allowed to go places by 
himself because he did not know how much 
change he was supposed to receive, and that 
she had to accompany him and handle the 
money. But McNeese acknowledged that, 
after he learned to read, applicant was able to 
distinguish the denominations on bills. 
McNeese also acknowledged that she had 
recently received letters from applicant and 
that his counting, reading, and writing ability 
had greatly improved since his 
imprisonment. 
 
Through McNeese, habeas counsel attempted 
to show that Junior treated applicant more 
harshly than his siblings and that he did so 
because he perceived applicant to be 
intellectually disabled. Habeas counsel 
elicited testimony from McNeese that Junior 
was more cruel to applicant than to her other 
siblings. McNeese stated that Junior would 
call applicant “dumb,” bend applicant’s hand 
back, and whip him when applicant could not 
spell words or read on command. McNeese 
stated that Junior would get especially angry 
when school representatives visited the house 
to say that applicant needed help. McNeese 
testified that she was present when Junior 
“ran off” two such representatives, one of 
whom suggested that applicant was 
intellectually disabled and needed a different 
educational setting. But McNeese stated that, 
at the time, she did not think that applicant 
was intellectually disabled. She also testified 
that, while applicant was “left behind” in 
school, he was always in regular classrooms. 
In contrast to her 2001 testimony that 
applicant functioned better and participated 
more when he was at places like Hester 
House, where Junior “could[n’t] . . . [mess] 
with him,” McNeese now asserted that 
applicant functioned the same whether Junior 
was present or absent. 
 
Contrary to his earlier statements, Larry 
Baker now remembered that applicant was 
the slowest kid in a group of neighborhood 
boys who played sports together and that the 
other boys teased applicant for being a 
“dummy” until Larry made them stop. Larry 
testified that, when they played football, 
applicant could not follow verbal play 
instructions very well and that Larry had to 
diagram plays in the dirt for him. When they 
played baseball, he had to repeatedly tell 
applicant not to sling the bat. Larry also now 
remembered that people tried to take 
advantage of applicant, although he recalled 
that applicant would stand up for himself. 
Although Larry did not dispute his 2001 
testimony concerning the advances applicant 
had made while in prison, he asserted that 
applicant’s letters did not reflect a mature, 
thoughtful person with a normal state of 
mind. 
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Through the testimony of Mark Fronkiewicz, 
who acknowledged that he had an extensive 
criminal record and was on parole for murder 
at the time of the hearing, habeas counsel 
attempted to minimize the evidence of 
applicant’s many pro se filings and other 
writings included in the record. Fronkiewicz 
testified that he spent 1988 to 1993 on death 
row, before inmates received appointed 
counsel, and he worked as a writ writer, 
assisting inmates with legal and personal 
correspondence and writ preparation. 
Fronkiewicz stated that he recognized 
applicant from death row, but had never 
talked to him. Fronkiewicz asserted that 
David Harris was another writ writer on death 
row when Fronkiewicz was there. 
Fronkiewicz said that Harris sought his 
assistance on a pro se writ that Harris was 
preparing for applicant. Fronkiewicz 
remembered discussing applicant’s case with 
Harris, but could not recall the date. 
 
Borda, who acknowledged in his 2013 
affidavit that forensic psychology “is not 
[his] specialty,” testified that he now 
concluded that applicant met the criteria for a 
intellectual disability diagnosis. In forming 
his current opinion, Borda relied on: the 
records he reviewed in preparation for his 
1993 evidentiary-hearing testimony; 
unspecified other medical records and 
affidavits provided by current writ counsel; 
unspecified other records, provided by 
unspecified other sources; “some family 
history”; Vitale’s and Garnett’s affidavits; 
Anderson’s written report; the 2014 
evidentiary hearing testimony of applicant’s 
relatives; and his own “really . . . very, very 
brief” assessment of applicant in December 
2013, which did not involve giving applicant 
“a [full scale] IQ test.” Borda acknowledged 
that he did not know much about the offense 
and had not read applicant’s confession or 
trial testimony. Borda asserted that Vitale, 
Garnett, and Anderson had also diagnosed 
applicant as intellectually disabled. 
 
Greenspan testified that he had a practice 
related to diagnosing intellectual disability in 
the forensic setting and that he performed the 
vast majority of his work for defense 
attorneys. In the roughly fourteen years since 
the Atkins decision, he had actually 
performed 10 to 12 clinical evaluations for 
intellectual disability and diagnosed 
intellectual disability in about two-thirds of 
them. Greenspan further testified that his 
clinical evaluations are not comprehensive 
because he focuses on the adaptive-deficits 
criterion. Greenspan stated that he taught IQ 
courses many years ago, but when working in 
his clinical capacity, at most, he only 
occasionally administers an IQ screening 
test. When determining whether a defendant 
satisfies the sub-average intellectual-
functioning criterion, Greenspan relies on IQ 
test scores in the defendant’s records. If none 
exist, then he requests that someone who is 
“more current” with IQ testing conduct such 
testing. 
 
Greenspan stated that he was testifying in 
applicant’s case as a teaching expert and 
acknowledged never having met or 
communicated with applicant. Greenspan 
also acknowledged that he had not read the 
transcript of either of applicant’s two trials. 
Although Greenspan did not offer a 
diagnosis, he testified that he had no reason 
to doubt Borda’s intellectual-disability 
diagnosis and saw no basis for any other 
diagnosis. 
 
Anderson testified that current writ counsel 
originally asked her to determine whether 
applicant was born with a brain anomaly 
(“organicity”) or evidenced a traumatic brain 
injury (TBI). To make those two 
determinations, Anderson reviewed 
unspecified school and medical records that 
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current writ counsel provided, conducted an 
initial diagnostic interview, and administered 
various neuropsychological tests. Anderson 
testified that the neuropsychological tests she 
gave were not IQ tests. 
 
Anderson stated that applicant’s scores on the 
tests she gave indicated language deficits, 
slowed processing speed (but an intact 
memory), and problems with reasoning and 
judgment. Anderson testified that applicant’s 
verbal memory score fell in the low-average 
range, reflected a weakness in his ability to 
acquire words (versus the ability to recall 
them once learned), and implicated his 
capacity to learn. She stated that applicant’s 
scores on the executive-functioning 
assessments she gave were all in the “severe” 
range. 
 
Anderson testified that, after she conveyed 
her findings on organicity and TBI to current 
writ counsel, he asked her to review the 
criteria for intellectual disability. Anderson 
testified that she has made intellectual-
disability determinations at least a few times 
in her practice. Anderson stated that, in 
making her intellectual-disability 
determination, she did not conduct any 
further evaluation except for a two-hour 
group interview of applicant’s relatives. 
Anderson opined that applicant would meet 
the DSM-IV’s and AAIDD’s criteria for 
intellectual disability. 
 
Jerry LeBlanc and Compton testified for the 
State at the 2014 evidentiary hearing. 
LeBlanc testified that he had worked at the 
Polunsky Unit’s commissary for fourteen 
years and and personally dealt with the 
commissary on a daily basis. LeBlanc 
explained the procedure by which death-row 
inmates request commissary items, described 
the kind of mathematical computations 
required to successfully complete a 
commissary form, and described his 
interactions with applicant regarding 
commissary transactions. 
 
While looking at applicant’s commissary 
records, LeBlanc testified to specific, recent 
examples of applicant having correctly 
computed multiple-unit order totals and 
having composed orders that came within 5¢ 
of the $85 limit. In one example, applicant 
used his funds to purchase fifteen postage 
stamps. LeBlanc also noted two examples of 
applicant having requested substitute items 
(one being a request for aspirin or dental floss 
in place of ibuprofen). LeBlanc testified that 
he did not help applicant complete 
commissary forms, and to his knowledge, no 
one else did. LeBlanc asserted that the 
commissary’s price list changed frequently 
and that, although there was another cell 
adjacent to applicant’s, the unit moved death-
row inmates frequently, and thus, applicant 
did not have the same neighbor for significant 
periods. 
 
LeBlanc additionally testified about his 
interactions with applicant regarding 
commissary transactions. LeBlanc stated that 
he and applicant had discussed what the 
commissary carried and whether it had 
correctly filled applicant’s order. When the 
commissary had charged applicant for 
undelivered or damaged items, applicant had 
noticed, brought it to LeBlanc’s attention, 
and been able to discuss the discrepancy or 
damage. LeBlanc had never received the 
impression that applicant was unable to 
understand what was going on with his 
commissary order or that he was unable to 
respond to LeBlanc’s questions. 
 
Compton stated that she had testified as an 
expert over seventy times and had conducted 
over 3,000 forensic evaluations, with about 
50% of her work having been directly for the 
courts, 40% for defense attorneys, and 10% 
for the State. In preparation for her testimony, 
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Compton reviewed applicant’s school 
records; past psychological testing results; 
TDCJ records (including commissary and 
disciplinary records); transcripts from 
applicant’s 1980 trial (including applicant’s 
testimony), 1983 Faretta hearing, and 2001 
punishment retrial (including Halpin and 
Wright’s expert testimony); letters from 
applicant to his attorney and others; motions 
filed by applicant; and recent photographs of 
items inside applicant’s cell. Compton also 
personally assessed applicant by 
interviewing him and administering 
standardized tests, including effort tests. 
Compton additionally attended the entire 
evidentiary hearing and listened to the other 
witnesses’ testimony. 
 
Compton testified that the data she reviewed 
did not support an intellectual-disability 
diagnosis. Based on applicant’s Flynn-
Effect-adjusted scores on IQ tests that she 
considered valid, Compton concluded that 
there was a greater probability than not that 
applicant’s intellectual functioning fell 
within the borderline range. But Compton 
noted that, when the standard error of 
measurement was applied to the mean of his 
valid, Flynn-Effect-adjusted IQ scores, the 
lower end of the scoring range could dip into 
the mild intellectual-disability range. 
Nevertheless, Compton opined that 
applicant’s level of adaptive functioning had 
been too great, even before he went to prison, 
to support an intellectual-disability diagnosis. 
 
After receiving the habeas court’s findings of 
fact and conclusions of law recommending 
that we grant relief on applicant’s Atkins 
claim, we filed and set the case to consider 
that allegation. 
 
III. Analysis 
 
To prevail on the allegation that he is 
intellectually disabled for Eighth 
Amendment purposes and, therefore, exempt 
from execution, applicant must prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that (1) he 
suffers from significantly sub-average 
general intellectual functioning, generally 
shown by an IQ of 70 or less; (2) his 
significantly sub-average general intellectual 
functioning is accompanied by significant 
and related limitations in adaptive 
functioning; and (3) the onset of the above 
two characteristics occurred before the age of 
eighteen.  
 
A. Significantly Sub-average General 
Intellectual Functioning 
 
Applicant has failed to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he has 
significantly sub-average general intellectual 
functioning. The IQ scores before us are: a 77 
IQ score obtained by applicant in 1971 (age 
12) on the OLMAT; a 57 IQ score obtained 
in 1972 (age 13) on the Slosson; a 78 IQ score 
obtained in 1973 (age 13) on the WISC; an 
estimated full scale IQ score of 71 obtained 
in 1984 (age 30) on an abbreviated WAIS-R; 
a 74 IQ score obtained in 1989 (age thirty) on 
a complete WAIS-R; an 85 IQ score obtained 
in 2013 (age 54) on the RCPM administered 
by Dr. Borda; and a 59 IQ score obtained in 
2014 (age 54) on the WAIS-IV administered 
by Dr. Compton. Applicant also asks us to 
rely on the IQ scores that Borda and Garnett 
derived from the mental-age scores that he 
obtained in 1973 (age 13) on the Bender 
Gestalt and Goodenough tests administered 
by Marcelle 
Tucker. 
 
At the 2014 evidentiary hearing, Borda 
identified the 57 IQ score on the Slosson as 
the first and most accurate assessment of 
applicant’s IQ. Borda reached 39 that 
conclusion because, due to “practice effects 
in IQ testing, usually the most accurate 
assessment is the first test that’s done.” He 
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also cited applicant’s lack of incentive to do 
poorly. Borda initially acknowledged that, 
like the RCPM, the Slosson is a group-
administered test and not one that is widely 
used. On further redirect examination, Borda 
asserted that, like the RCPM, the Slosson 
could also be individually administered, but 
he acknowledged that the Slosson was not a 
test that he would use. 
 
Borda discounted applicant’s 78 IQ score on 
the WISC. First, Borda asserted that 
applicant’s WISC score should be adjusted to 
70 for the Flynn Effect. Second, Borda noted 
that applicant contemporaneously took 
Bender Gestalt and Goodenough tests. 
Although he acknowledged that the Bender 
Gestalt and Goodenough tests are not IQ 
tests, Borda explained that he used 
applicant’s mental-age scores on those 
instruments to derive IQ scores. Borda stated 
that he calculated an IQ score of 67 on the 
Bender Gestalt and an unspecified IQ score 
on the Goodenough. He then adjusted both 
derived scores for the Flynn Effect, arriving 
at a 56 IQ for the Bender Gestalt and a “mid-
60s” IQ score for the Goodenough. Borda 
testified that the derived, Flynn-Effect-
adjusted IQ scores on the Bender Gestalt and 
Goodenough tests indicated that the WISC 
score overstated applicant’s level of 
intellectual functioning. 
 
Borda also discounted applicant’s 74 IQ 
score on the 1989 WAIS-R, asserting that it 
should be adjusted to 71 for the Flynn Effect. 
Borda asserted that applicant’s 85 IQ score 
on the RCPM could be artificially high due to 
the practice effect because the RCPM is very 
similar to the matrices portion of the 
Wechsler Scale IQ tests. But Borda 
acknowledged that, when he gave the RCPM, 
applicant had not been subjected to any 
meaningful IQ testing for over a decade. 
Borda also acknowledged that the AAIDD is 
the commonly accepted national authority on 
intellectual disability and that, per the 
AAIDD, the practice effect is nonexistent 
after seven years. 
 
Borda acknowledged that he did not conduct 
effort testing when he assessed applicant. 
Borda asserted that no good effort test exists 
for people with below-average IQs because 
most such tools gauge memory; therefore, 
people with memory problems will not score 
well on them. He also testified that effort tests 
are not normed for the below-average IQ 
population. Borda further asserted that, for a 
person with as much experience as he 
possessed, any malingering would be 
obvious from simple observation. But Borda 
denied taking the position in his testimony 
that effort testing is inapplicable to 
intellectually disabled people.  
 
Borda agreed that applicant had a difficult 
childhood, describing it as “a horrible 
background” in which “a very authoritarian 
father” created “a very dependent” and 
“fearful” child. Although he acknowledged 
that applicant’s childhood environment did 
not help his intellectual development, Borda 
asserted that applicant was “very limited” to 
begin with. Borda acknowledged that a 
learning disability is not the same as 
intellectual disability and that emotional 
disturbances (including depression) and 
environmental conditions (including living in 
an abusive household or having parents who 
are not intellectually curious) can adversely 
affect a person’s learning ability and IQ 
scores. Borda also acknowledged that facing 
the death penalty could adversely affect 
motivation or cause depression and 
negatively affect test performance. 
 
Borda acknowledged that others testified that 
applicant had done well and improved his 
academic skills while on death row. 
However, Borda did not find this testimony 
persuasive. Borda concluded that applicant 
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was able to develop these skills on death row 
because he had abundant time to practice 
very specific and essentially unchanging 
tasks. 
 
Greenspan disregarded applicant’s 77 IQ 
score on the OLMAT, asserting that the 
OLMAT is a group-administered test. He 
stated that group-administered tests are not 
comprehensive and do not yield a full-scale 
measure of intelligence. Greenspan also 
discounted applicant’s 57 IQ score on the 
Slosson. Greenspan testified that, while the 
Slosson could be individually administered, 
it is a screening test that is not as 
comprehensive as the WISC and it is not 
considered a gold-standard test for diagnostic 
purposes. Greenspan also stated that the 
version of the Slosson test given to applicant 
derived IQ scores by the unreliable and now-
abandoned ratio method that compared 
chronological and mental age. He testified 
that the Slosson is now scored using the more 
valid statistical-deviation method. Greenspan 
further indicated that the degree of statistical 
deviation from the mean is the currently 
accepted method of evaluating an 
individual’s intellectual functioning. 
 
Greenspan testified that the Wechsler scale is 
considered the gold standard. But Greenspan 
testified that applicant’s 78 IQ score on the 
WISC should be reduced for the Flynn Effect 
to below 70, if applicant took the original 
WISC, or to between 70 and 71, if applicant 
took the WISC-R. Greenspan testified that, 
even without correcting for the Flynn Effect, 
the standard error of measurement (SEM) 
meant that applicant’s WISC score could 
have been as low as 73. But Greenspan also 
volunteered that the score obtained on the 
WISC by someone who, like applicant, came 
from a poor, African-American family could 
underestimate the actual level of intellectual 
functioning. 
Greenspan testified that the WAIS-IV is the 
current gold standard for IQ tests, and he 
emphasized that applicant obtained an IQ 
score of 59 on the WAIS-IV that Dr. 
Compton had recently administered. 
Although he had earlier testified that 
applicant’s Slosson score was unreliable, 
Greenspan emphasized that applicant’s 
WAIS-IV score was almost identical to 
applicant’s Slosson score. 
 
On direct examination, Greenspan testified 
that the validity of effort tests for people in 
the intellectually disabled range had not been 
adequately established. Greenspan asserted 
that the two best indicators of effort for 
intellectually disabled people are (1) the 
clinical judgment of an experienced 
evaluator; and (2) whether current test results 
are congruent with past test results, especially 
on tests given when the subject had no 
incentive to do poorly. Based on the 
testimony given at the 2014 evidentiary 
hearing by applicant’s relatives, Greenspan 
concluded that a lack of ability was a more 
likely explanation for applicant’s poor test 
scores than a lack of good effort. 
 
On cross-examination, however, Greenspan 
acknowledged that the recommended 
practice in forensic psychology is to conduct 
effort testing, especially when one is 
administering cognitive measures. 
Greenspan denied taking the position, on 
direct examination, that effort testing is less 
applicable to someone with intellectual 
disability. He clarified that the results of 
effort tests given to intellectually disabled 
people are more difficult to interpret, because 
of problems validating effort tests for low IQ 
individuals. Greenspan agreed that it is 
important to analyze the results of IQ testing 
to ensure validity, especially when an 
external motive to exaggerate symptoms 
might exist. Greenspan also agreed that, for 
many people, facing the death penalty would 
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be a significant external motivating factor. 
Greenspan volunteered that “there are all 
kinds of reasons why someone would give a 
poor effort and one of them is if you have a 
history of failure in academic settings[;] you 
might go too quickly or you might not give 
optimal effort because you just assume it’s 
not going to make any difference.” 
 
Anderson did not administer any IQ testing 
when she examined applicant. She did not 
testify about the reliability of any particular 
IQ test or IQ score reflected in the record. 
She acknowledged that factors unrelated to a 
person’s actual mental ability can lower test 
scores, including depression, psychosis, and 
external motivations to obtain a lower score, 
such as facing the death penalty. 
 
Compton disregarded applicant’s OLMAT 
and Slosson scores, stating that those 
instruments were group tests and lacked high 
validity. Compton indicated that applicant’s 
1972 Slosson score was particularly 
problematic due to research suggesting that, 
in the 1970s, the Slosson had extremely poor 
validity in determining intellectual disability. 
Compton also disregarded the Bender Gestalt 
and Goodenough tests because they were 
neuropsychological screening instruments 
rather than IQ tests. 
 
Compton testified that applicant’s 78 IQ 
score on the WISC was the most reliable IQ 
score reflected in his records because it was 
the first and only full scale, individually 
administered IQ test given during the 
developmental period. Compton stated that, 
because she could not tell whether applicant 
took the original WISC or the WISC-R, she 
made alternative Flynn Effect adjustments to 
his reported score: 69 to 70 IQ, assuming that 
applicant took the original WISC, and 73 to 
74 IQ, assuming that he took the WISC-R. 
 
Compton noted that applicant’s IQ might be 
higher than his Flynn-Effect-adjusted WISC 
score because family reports suggested that 
he was traumatized as a child by paternal 
abuse. Compton explained that childhood 
trauma can cause low IQ scores because the 
stressful environment makes it difficult for 
the child to get enough rest, focus, and learn. 
 
Compton, who testified that she had worked 
in a prison system, doubted the validity of 
applicant’s IQ scores on TDCJ-administered 
tests because prison IQ assessments do not 
typically include effort testing. Compton 
asserted that effort testing is important when 
assessing cognitive deficits because, if the 
subject is not exerting effort, the assessment 
will inaccurately represent his ability. 
 
Compton also stated that many inmates are 
depressed and that depression can lower IQ 
scores. Although TDCJ never formally 
diagnosed applicant with depression, he 
exhibited withdrawn and depressive behavior 
throughout his time on death row, and he 
demonstrated similar behavior earlier in his 
life. Compton also noted a 2005 TDCJ report 
stating that applicant wrote a suicide note, 
although the report indicated that applicant 
denied having written it. Compton testified 
that applicant’s affect was flat during her 45 
evaluation and he seemed a little depressed. 
Although he denied being currently 
depressed, applicant admitted that he had 
experienced some depression in the past. And 
while applicant was not formally diagnosed 
with depression during his schooling, school 
officials twice recognized that he was 
experiencing emotional disturbances. 
 
Compton did not consider applicant’s 59 IQ 
score on the WAIS-IV that she administered 
to be valid due to persistent indicators 
throughout her assessment that applicant was 
exerting suboptimal effort. After 
interviewing him about his personal history, 
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Compton gave applicant the Test of Memory 
Malingering (TOMM), an effort test. 
Compton testified that applicant’s results 
suggested that he was not exerting full effort, 
even when she gave him the benefit of the 
doubt by assuming that he was intellectually 
disabled and applying only the specific 
norms for intellectually disabled individuals. 
When Compton subsequently administered 
the WAIS-IV, applicant obtained a full scale 
IQ score that was significantly lower than she 
had expected. Further, Compton stated, her 
analysis of applicant’s WAIS-IV results 
revealed pervasive internal discrepancies that 
indicated suboptimal performance. 
 
Compton testified that her analysis of 
applicant’s WAIS-IV results also revealed a 
significant discrepancy between the 
crystallized knowledge that applicant had 
demonstrated in 1989 intelligence testing and 
what he currently professed to know. When 
Compton asked applicant what a 
thermometer was, he told her that he did not 
know, although he had answered the same 
question correctly when an examiner had 
asked it in 1989. Compton stated that it was 
rare to simply forget the meaning of a 
previously known word and noted that both 
her own and Dr. Anderson’s testing had 
placed applicant’s memory in the lowaverage 
range. When Compton checked the validity 
of her WAIS-IV testing with additional effort 
testing, the results (lower than expected 
scores and indications of suboptimal effort) 
were very similar to applicant’s WAIS-IV 
results. 
 
The record does not support considering 
applicant’s IQ scores on the OLMAT, 
Slosson, 1984 abbreviated WAIS-R, 2013 
RCPM, or derived IQ scores on the Bender 
Gestalt and Goodenough tests given in 1973, 
because of the evidence that these 
instruments were 
noncomprehensive screening or group IQ 
tests, neuropsychological tests rather than IQ 
tests, or derived IQ scores using the ratio 
method and concept of mental age rather than 
the degree of statistical deviation from the 
mean. The record additionally does not 49 
support considering applicant’s IQ score on 
the WAIS-IV, given the compelling evidence 
of his suboptimal effort on that instrument. 
We are left with applicant’s 78 IQ score on 
the WISC at age 13 in 1973 and his 74 IQ 
score on the WAIS-R at age 30 in 1989. 
 
Taking into account the standard error of 
measurement, applicant’s score range on the 
WISC is between 73 and 83. The fact that 
applicant took a now-outmoded version of 
the WISC in 1973 might tend to place his 
actual IQ score in a somewhat lower portion 
of that 73 to 83 range. However, the evidence 
that applicant was traumatized by paternal 
violence, was referred for testing due to 
withdrawn behavior, came from an 
impoverished and minority cultural 
background, and started to abuse drugs by the 
time of testing might tend to place his actual 
IQ in a somewhat higher portion of that 73–
83 range. “Taken altogether, there is no 
reason to think that applicant’s obtained IQ 
score” of 78 on the WISC “is inaccurate or 
does not fairly represent his borderline 
intelligence during the developmental stage.” 
 
The score that applicant obtained on the 1989 
WAIS-R supports the conclusion that his 
WISC score accurately and fairly represented 
his intellectual functioning during the 
developmental period. Applicant’s score 
range on the WAIS-R is between 69 and 79. 
As with the WISC, the fact that applicant 
took a now-outmoded version of the WAIS-
R might tend to place his actual IQ score in a 
somewhat lower portion of that 69 to 79 
range. However, by the time he took the 
WAIS-R, applicant had a history of academic 
failure, something that his own expert stated 
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could adversely affect effort. Applicant also 
took the WAIS-R under adverse 
circumstances; he was on death row and 
facing the prospect of execution, and he had 
exhibited withdrawn and depressive 
behavior. These considerations might tend to 
place his actual IQ in a somewhat higher 
portion of that 69 to 79 range.  Considering 
these factors together, we find no reason to 
doubt that applicant’s WAIS-R score 
accurately and fairly represented his 
intellectual functioning as being above the 
intellectually disabled range.  
 
B. Significant, Related Deficits in Adaptive 
Behavior 
 
Even if applicant had proven that he suffers 
from significantly sub-average general 
intellectual functioning, his Atkins claim fails 
because he has not proven by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he has 
significant and related limitations in adaptive 
functioning. 
 
At the 2014 evidentiary hearing, Borda 
defined adaptive functioning as the ability to 
successfully do everyday things on one’s 
own. But Borda also asserted that adaptive 
functioning describes a concept that is more 
complicated than being able to perform a 
certain specific task, such as balancing a 
checkbook. He characterized adaptive 
functioning as neuropsychological or 
executive frontal-lobe functioning, such as 
the ability to make a decision, implement the 
decision, assess whether one is getting to a 
correct solution, and if not, to modify his 
behavior. 
 
On direct examination, Borda agreed with 
habeas counsel’s statement that applicant’s 
family history indicated that applicant had 
“strong” problems adapting, as to social 
behaviors and the academic realm. But Borda 
gave no more specific testimony about 
deficits in adaptive behavior. On cross-
examination and redirect, Borda 51 
acknowledged that standardized measures of 
adaptive functioning exist, that many 
adolescents with poor adaptive skills—for 
example, homeless teenagers—are not 
intellectually disabled, and that just because 
someone lacks certain skills does not mean 
that the person is intellectually disabled. 
Borda also acknowledged that applicant had 
adaptive skills during the developmental 
period, but opined that they were probably 
below average for someone of his age. 
 
The State asked Borda whether evidence that 
applicant mowed grass for money and 
hustled pool suggested that he had money 
skills, knowledge that he needed to earn 
money, and the self-direction to obtain a job 
to make it. Borda suggested that he did not 
have sufficient information to render an 
opinion because he did not know whether 
applicant had independently thought of these 
ways to make money. Borda initially 
suggested that the offense facts did not 
indicate that applicant possessed adaptive 
skills, due to Borda’s impression that others 
dragged applicant into it, that applicant went 
along because he was afraid to say no, and 
that no particular planning went into the 
offense. Borda stated that intellectually 
disabled people are suggestible and, if told to 
do something, they will do it. But Borda 
acknowledged that he did not know much 
about the offense and had not read applicant’s 
confession or trial testimony. 
 
Greenspan testified that, for purposes of 
diagnosing intellectual disability, “adaptive 
functioning” concerns how one functions in 
the world. He stated that adaptive functioning 
is not the same as executive functioning, 
which is a cognitive measure that looks at 
certain underlying reasoning skills. On direct 
examination, Greenspan asserted that he saw 
no evidence of applicant’s competence in any 
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of the adaptive behavior areas. On 
crossexamination, Greenspan acknowledged 
that applicant had areas “of greater ability,” 
but asserted that they did not exclude an 
intellectual-disability diagnosis. Although 
Greenspan stated that he was generally 
familiar with the facts of applicant’s offense, 
he acknowledged that he had not read the 
transcript of either of applicant’s two trials. 
 
Greenspan testified that the Texas 
Independent Living Scale (TILS) given to 
applicant by Dr. Compton is a standardized 
test that is generally accepted within the 
psychological community and considered a 
direct measure of adaptive behavior. He 
emphasized that applicant scored two-and-a-
half standard deviations below the mean on 
the TILS. 
 
Greenspan minimized the evidence that 
applicant had learned to survive on the street 
and in prison. Despite his earlier definition of 
adaptive behavior, Greenspan asserted that 
applicant’s ability to function in prison and 
street environments did not necessarily 
reflect “adaptive” behavior, as that term is 
understood by the psychological community. 
Greenspan did not think that any of 
applicant’s performance on the following 
activities evidenced adaptive skills: (1) in 
preparation for his new punishment trial, 
consulting with counsel about whether to 
inform the jury that he had been on death 
row; (2) concealing a shotgun in a shopping 
bag when entering a store to rob it; (3) 
attempting to conceal his appearance during 
the offense by wearing a wig and sunglasses, 
and after the offense, changing his 
appearance by shaving his head; (4) arguing 
with accomplices over how to divide the 
proceeds of the crime; (5) deciding to 
stipulate that he had prior criminal 
convictions and responding appropriately to 
questioning by the court to determine 
whether the stipulation was voluntary, 
knowing, and intelligent; (6) writing four 
letters to his appellate lawyer that escalated 
from, “When are you going to file my 
appeal?,” to “I object to you getting any 
extensions” to “Why won’t you respond to 
any of my letters?” to “I object to you being 
my lawyer from this point forward”; (6) 
hustling pool; and (7) working as a barber and 
a porter in prison. 
 
Anderson testified that she conducted a group 
interview of applicant’s relatives to 
determine whether applicant had any 
longstanding, chronic deficits. From 
applicant’s relatives, Anderson learned that 
he had unspecified deficits that were seen 
early and reported by his school. Applicant’s 
relatives also told Anderson that he was never 
left alone, someone had to “hold his hand,” 
and he needed help with his homework. 
 
Anderson acknowledged that, if a person 
donned a wig before entering a business to 
commit robbery, it indicated some 
forethought and planning, but she could not 
say whether the behavior showed an ability to 
protect one’s self-interest. Anderson had no 
opinion on whether walking into the business 
with a shotgun concealed in shopping bags 
demonstrated an ability to plan ahead and 
protect one’s self-interest. Anderson testified 
that committing a crime and then fleeing to 
another city did not necessarily demonstrate 
the ability to form and execute a plan for self-
preservation. Anderson denied seeing 
evidence that applicant had excelled in any 
way since being imprisoned. 
 
Compton stated that adaptive functioning 
examines everyday social, practical, and 
conceptual skills. She testified that she gave 
applicant a TILS test and acknowledged that 
applicant’s TILS score fell two-and-a-half 
standard deviations below the mean. But 
Compton explained that the TILS score was 
not an accurate representation of applicant’s 
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abilities because she had to assign zeroes to 
questions asking about areas to which 
applicant had no exposure, such as writing a 
check and using a microwave oven. 
 
When Compton gave applicant a complete 
WRAT-4, a test of academic abilities, his 
results fell within the second-grade level for 
mathematical skills and the third-grade level 
for reading comprehension and writing skills. 
Compton noted that applicant’s writing 
ability scores on the WRAT-4 were 
inconsistent with the seventh-grade level 
ability he had demonstrated in letters he had 
written to friends. Compton testified that 
applicant’s performance on the WRAT-4 
math subtest was also internally inconsistent. 
Although applicant was able to perform 
advanced math at certain times, at other 
times, he missed very simple questions. 
Applicant’s performance on the WRAT-4 
math subtest was also inconsistent with 
abilities he had demonstrated elsewhere, 
including in his commissary records. 
Compton testified that these inconsistencies 
increased the probability that applicant was 
not exerting full effort on the WRAT-4 math 
subtest. 
 
Compton testified that she found some 
limitations in applicant’s academic skills and 
some adaptive deficits in social interaction 
during the developmental period, but she also 
saw evidence of adaptive skills. For example, 
she saw evidence that applicant had lived in 
the back of a pool hall, as well as evidence 
that he had played pool and mowed lawns for 
money. Compton said that living on the 
streets in itself required applicant to engage 
in adaptive behavior. She opined that playing 
pool and mowing lawns showed some ability 
to understand money and work concepts. 
 
Compton also saw evidence that applicant 
possessed adaptive skills at the time of the 
offense and original trial. Applicant’s 
behavior surrounding the crime (wearing a 
wig, covering up the gun, and fleeing to 
Louisiana) all indicated planning, 
forethought, and an appreciation of the need 
to do something to avoid apprehension, 
which also related to his ability to engage in 
abstract thinking. 
 
Compton added that applicant’s 1980 trial 
testimony indicated that he had some ability 
to engage in abstract reasoning because he 
was able to conceptualize what his counsel 
and the State were asking and to form 
appropriate and exculpatory answers. 
Compton noted that applicant withstood both 
direct and cross examination and he testified 
in a coherent fashion. Compton stated that 
testifying and undergoing cross examination 
is a stressful experience for most people. 
Applicant’s 1980 trial testimony also showed 
that he was able to process and respond to 
questions without significant difficulty even 
under stressful conditions. Applicant’s 
testimony showed that he could 
conceptualize the process and form 
exculpatory responses and alternative 
explanations, which further indicated an 
ability to process and manipulate information 
and form a response. Compton 
acknowledged that defense counsel may have 
prepared applicant for his 1980 trial 
testimony, but she noted that applicant had 
not had a lawyer to coach him for his 1983 
Faretta hearing, at which he represented 
himself. Applicant had been able to 
understand what the trial court was asking 
him at the Faretta hearing and had responded 
appropriately, although he had difficulty with 
some of the legal issues. 
 
Compton also saw evidence that applicant 
had developed adaptive skills in prison. In 
addition to representing himself at the 1983 
Faretta hearing, applicant had learned to read 
and write in prison. His personal, handwritten 
correspondence demonstrated a seventh-
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grade writing ability. Compton indicated that 
applicant’s writing ability could exceed a 
seventh-grade level if he also wrote the 
various handwritten and typewritten pro se 
motions presented at the evidentiary hearing. 
Regarding the handwritten pro se motions, 
Compton observed that the handwriting was 
very similar to the handwriting that she had 
seen throughout her review of applicant’s 
case. Regarding the typewritten documents, 
Compton testified that applicant told her that 
he did not know how to type and that she had 
been told that he did not own a typewriter. 
Compton also acknowledged that inmates 
share pleadings and that Fronciewiz had 
testified that inmate David Harris had worked 
for applicant at one time. But Compton 
testified that simply being involved in the 
process by copying the motions by hand 
would indicate understanding and require the 
ability to write. Compton opined that copying 
a legal motion would be something within the 
realm of only a few intellectually disabled 
people. 
 
Compton found additional evidence of 
adaptive skills in applicant’s TDCJ records. 
She testified that a disciplinary report stated 
that another inmate had been in applicant’s 
cell to play dominoes. Compton opined that 
this indicated that applicant possessed social 
interaction skills and the ability to count 
because the game of dominoes required that 
skill. 
 
Compton noted that applicant’s TDCJ 
classification file included a letter and 
questionnaire from TDCJ to the manager of 
Two-K restaurant, where applicant had 
previously worked. Compton agreed that the 
manager’s responses showed that applicant 
could function in the capacity for which he 
had been hired. Regarding disciplinary 
problems, the manager had written that 
applicant was “capable of influencing others 
to dissent [and] like[d] confrontation.” 
Compton testified that the comment 
evidenced applicant’s conceptual and 
leadership skills. 
 
Compton agreed that applicant’s 
classification file also included a Social 
Summary, dated December 1, 1983, in which 
applicant had cited the advice of counsel and 
declined to discuss his offense. Compton 
stated that the fact that applicant declined 
questioning on the advice of counsel showed 
that he had the ability to understand 
instruction, conceptualize it, and act on it. 
Compton testified that incidents documented 
in applicant’s death-row disciplinary records 
demonstrated his ability to form the intent to 
influence other people and to act on it, which 
fell within the social-skills domain, and the 
ability to stand up to authority, which was 
inconsistent with suggestibility and 
gullibility. 
 
Compton also found evidence of adaptive 
skills in items that had recently been found in 
applicant’s cell. Compton stated that a packet 
of handwritten letters, which were all in the 
same handwriting, had a seventh-grade-level 
readability score. She testified that a 
composition notebook found in applicant’s 
cell contained the same handwriting 
throughout it. Although Compton 
acknowledged that applicant might have 
copied some of the notebook’s contents from 
other sources, she indicated that other parts 
might have been the product of applicant’s 
independent thought. The composition book 
contained a handwritten table matching the 
Wechsler Scales’s normal distribution of IQ 
scores, which suggested to Compton that 
applicant was investigating IQ scores from 
his prison cell. 
 
Compton agreed that books, a newspaper, 
and newspaper articles were found in 
applicant’s cell. Each of the books, which 
included copies of the Qur’an and Know 
Your Islam, had applicant’s name, inmate 
identification number, and a date written 
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inside the cover. One of the articles 
concerned winning an appeal. Many of the 
books and newspaper articles found in 
applicant’s cell contained underlining. 
Compton testified that an underlined passage 
could indicate that a person is reading and 
comprehending the underlined text. Although 
Compton acknowledged that people 
sometimes also underline passages that they 
do not fully understand, she testified that the 
action of underlining indicates the person’s 
desire to return to the passage and review it, 
and thus still involves processing and 
conceptualization. Compton also stated that 
even if a person underlines passages because 
he does not understand them, the act implies 
that he has understood the surrounding text. 
 
Other items found in applicant’s cell included 
heavily notated calendars for the years 2012 
through 2014. Compton testified that 
notations on the calendars indicated that 
applicant understood the concept of months, 
an understanding that he also demonstrated in 
Compton’s testing. She agreed that the 
calendars had sections for people’s names, 
addresses, and telephone numbers, all of 
which were appropriately completed. 
 
Compton also found it significant that 
applicant’s expert witnesses at the 2001 
punishment retrial (i.e., Halpin and Wright) 
determined that applicant’s adaptive abilities 
had progressed since his imprisonment and 
that his progress indicated that he had a 
strong ability to learn. Compton noted that 
another witness at the 2001 retrial, Jo Ann 
Cross, had echoed Halpin’s and Wright’s 
testimony regarding applicant’s ability to 
learn. 
 
We find Compton’s opinion far more 
credible and reliable than those of applicant’s 
experts who testified at the 2014 evidentiary 
hearing. The record shows that Compton is a 
forensic psychologist with considerable 
experience in conducting forensic 
evaluations. Her testimony shows that she 
thoroughly and rigorously reviewed a great 
deal of material concerning applicant’s 
intellectual functioning and adaptive 
behavior. In addition, she personally 
evaluated applicant. During that evaluation, 
Compton administered comprehensive IQ 
testing via the WAIS-IV, a gold-standard 
test; various forms of effort testing to assess 
the validity of her IQ testing; and the TILS, a 
standardized measure of adaptive 
functioning. Compton testified in detail about 
why, even applying the most lenient 
standards, the results of her effort testing 
suggested that applicant had exerted 
suboptimal effort on the WAIS-IV. Compton 
also gave persuasive and unrebutted 
testimony explaining why applicant’s score 
on the TILS under-represented his adaptive 
skills. She further detailed numerous 
examples in applicant’s records that 
demonstrated his adaptive skills. 
 
In contrast, Borda, Greenspan, and Anderson 
were clinical psychologists or clinical neuro-
psychologists whose credibility suffered 
from their review of relatively limited 
material. Greenspan did not personally assess 
applicant, and his testimony suggested that 
his direct experience with IQ testing was 
fairly limited and remote in time. 
 
Although he personally examined applicant, 
Borda conceded that the assessment was 
extremely brief and did not include 
comprehensive, full-scale IQ testing with a 
gold-standard instrument or effort testing. 
Borda and Greenspan also premised many of 
their conclusions on the concept of mental 
age and used the unreliable ratio method to 
calculate IQ scores from instruments that 
were not designed for such purposes. 
Although Anderson personally examined 
applicant, she did so for a purpose other than 
evaluating him for intellectual disability. 
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Further, Anderson did not administer any test 
for the purpose of obtaining an IQ score and, 
from her testimony, she appeared to have 
completed relatively few intellectual 
disability assessments. 
 
Further, each of applicant’s experts who 
testified at the evidentiary hearing appear to 
have applied a more demanding standard to 
the issue of adaptive behavior than we have 
contemplated for Eighth Amendment 
purposes.  
 
Although Borda testified that adaptive 
functioning is the ability to successfully do 
everyday things on one’s own, he also 
characterized it as executive functioning. 
Greenspan defined adaptive behavior as how 
one functions in the world and expressly 
acknowledged that adaptive behavior and 
executive functioning are distinct concepts. 
However, Greenspan’s application of the 
definition to the evidence—for example, his 
minimization of the evidence that applicant 
had learned to survive on the street and in 
prison—suggest that he was actually 
applying a more stringent standard. 
Alternatively, it suggests that Greenspan’s 
opinions were not reasonable. Anderson was 
not asked to define adaptive functioning, but 
in her testimony, she often equated adaptive 
functioning with executive functioning. 
 
Compton’s opinion finds further support in 
applicant’s school records, which were 
accurately summarized at the 2001 
punishment retrial by applicant’s expert 
witness. Those records reflect applicant’s 
poor academic grades (especially in areas 
involving language), uneven conduct grades, 
retention in first grade, below-grade-level 
scores on academic-achievement tests, and 
references to instances of withdrawn 
behavior. In kindergarten, a physician 
considered the possibility that applicant’s 
withdrawn behavior was due to intellectual 
disability, although the physician indicated 
that emotional problems were the more likely 
cause. Subsequent IQ testing on a gold-
standard instrument yielded a score that was 
not in the intellectually disabled range—even 
considering the extreme low end of the 
scoring range—and applicant remained in 
regular classrooms throughout his time in 
school. 
 
Although Compton found that applicant 
manifested some limitations in academic and 
social-interaction skills during the 
developmental period, she testified that his 
level of adaptive functioning had been too 
great, even before he went to prison, to 
support an intellectual-disability diagnosis. 
But even assuming for purposes of argument 
that applicant’s limitations in academic and 
social-interaction skills were significant, the 
record does not support a finding that these 
deficits were linked to significantly sub-
average general intellectual functioning. 
Rather, the record overwhelmingly supports 
the conclusion that applicant’s academic 
difficulties were caused by a variety of 
factors, including trauma from the 
emotionally and physically abusive 
atmosphere in which he was raised, 
undiagnosed learning disorders, changing 
elementary schools three times in three years, 
racially motivated harassment and violence at 
school, a history of academic failure, drug 
abuse, and absenteeism. The same is true of 
any social difficulty that applicant 
experienced during the developmental 
period. 
 
The significant advances applicant has 
demonstrated while confined on death row 
further support the conclusion that his 
academic and social difficulties were not 
related to significantly sub-average general 
intellectual functioning. In addition, our 
consideration of the Briseno evidentiary 
factors weighs heavily against a finding that 
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applicant’s adaptive deficits, of whatever 
nature and degree they may be, are related to 
significantly sub-average general intellectual 
functioning. 
 
The first Briseno factor considers whether 
those who knew applicant best during the 
developmental stage considered him to be 
intellectually disabled and acted in 
accordance with that determination. The 
evidence does not weigh in applicant’s favor. 
 
Although the physician who examined 
applicant before kindergarten considered 
intellectual disability as a possible cause for 
applicant’s withdrawn behavior, the 
physician contemporaneously stated that 
emotional problems were the more likely 
cause. Applicant’s records do not reflect any 
intellectual-disability diagnosis, and they do 
show that he remained in normal classrooms 
during his school career. 
 
At the evidentiary hearing, habeas counsel 
attempted to show that applicant’s father 
singled applicant out for abuse and threw 
applicant out of the house because he 
perceived applicant as being intellectually 
disabled or “slow.” However, the record is 
replete with evidence that Junior physically 
and emotionally abused all of his children, as 
well as with evidence that Junior also drove 
some of applicant’s siblings from the family 
home. Although there is evidence that 
applicant’s inability to spell on command 
may have angered Junior, there is abundant 
evidence from multiple sources that applicant 
was the target of Junior’s ire because he 
intervened in his parents’ altercations, tried to 
protect his mother and other siblings from 
Junior, and often caught Junior in infidelity. 
The record also indicates that applicant was 
left in charge of his younger siblings. And 
applicant’s sister, Colleen McNeese, testified 
at the 2014 evidentiary hearing that she had 
not considered applicant to be intellectually 
disabled. 
 
Regarding the second Briseno factor, the 
evidence shows that applicant formulated 
plans and carried them through. The various 
affidavits, testimony, and interviews that 
applicant’s relatives have given indicate that, 
when he and his siblings were hungry, 
applicant took it upon himself to earn money 
from the neighbors and then used the money 
to buy food. During his 1980 trial, applicant 
insisted on presenting an alibi defense, and 
his testimony was consistent with that 
defense. He doggedly pursued his desire to 
obtain new appellate counsel after his 1980 
trial by writing to various courts, attorneys, 
and organizations, filing pleadings and 
motions, and marshaling exhibits to present 
at the 1983 Faretta hearing. The previously 
mentioned conduct and incidents in 
applicant’s prison disciplinary records also 
indicate leadership, the third Briseno factor.  
 
The fourth and fifth Briseno factors address 
whether applicant responds rationally and 
appropriately to external stimuli and whether 
he responds coherently, rationally, and on 
point to oral or written questions. The many 
instances of applicant’s testimony and 
interactions with courts over the course of 
this case, as well as the testimony of 
witnesses at his 2001 punishment retrial, 
indicate that the answers to these questions 
are yes. 
 
The varying statements that applicant gave to 
police about the offense and his 1980 and 
1993 testimony indicate that he can hide facts 
or lie effectively in his own interest, the sixth 
Briseno factor. The facts of the offense 
further indicate that it required forethought, 
planning, and moderately complex execution 
of purpose, the final Briseno factor. 
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C. Onset During the Developmental Period 
 
Given applicant’s failure to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he suffers 
from significantly sub-average general 
intellectual functioning and that any 
significant deficits in adaptive behavior are 
related to significantly sub-average general 
intellectual functioning, he has not 
established that he was intellectually disabled 
before the age of eighteen. 
 
In sum, we conclude that for Eighth 
Amendment purposes, applicant is a person 
capable of functioning adequately in his 
everyday world with intellectual 
understanding and moral appreciation of his 
behavior. We therefore reject applicant’s 
contention that he is exempt from execution 
under Atkins. 
 
Conclusion 
 
For the reasons discussed above, we deny 
relief on applicant’s first claim after 
assuming our role as the ultimate fact-finder 
in this case regarding applicant’s assertion 
that he is entitled to relief under Atkins.  
 
The habeas court did not enter findings of fact 
and conclusions of law regarding applicant’s 
second and third claims for relief. In his 
second claim, applicant contends that he was 
denied due process because Texas’s death-
penalty statute does not contemplate 
intellectual disability as a bar to the execution 
of an intellectually disabled individual. In his 
third claim, applicant contends that his death 
sentence violated the Sixth Amendment 
under 
 
Atkins and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 
(2002), because the jury’s verdict did not 
include a determination of an essential 
element of capital murder—that he is not 
intellectually disabled. Applicant’s briefing 
concerning his second claim is inadequate 
because he fails to plead and prove facts 
which would entitle him to relief.  
 
The Court has previously rejected the Ring 
argument that applicant raises in his third 
claim. Applicant’s second and third claims 
for relief are denied. 
 
As to applicant’s remaining claims (Claims 
4–48), we find that the record supports the 
habeas court’s findings of fact, conclusions 
of law, and recommendation. We accordingly 
adopt “Respondent’s Proposed Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order” 
regarding Claims 4–48, and deny relief on all 
of applicant’s claims. 
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“Supreme Court to Hear Death Penalty Cases” 
 
The New York Times 
Adam Liptak 
June 6, 2016 
 
The Supreme Court on Monday agreed to 
hear two appeals raising questions about the 
roles race and intellectual disability might 
play in capital prosecutions. 
One case, Buck v. Stephens, No. 15-8049, 
arose from a psychologist’s testimony that 
black defendants were more dangerous than 
white ones. 
The case concerns Duane Buck, who was 
convicted of the 1995 murders of a former 
girlfriend and one of her friends while her 
young children watched. Texas law allows 
death sentences only if prosecutors can show 
the defendant poses a future danger to 
society. 
During the trial’s sentencing phase, Mr. 
Buck’s lawyer presented testimony from the 
psychologist, Walter Quijano, who said that 
race was one of the factors associated with 
future dangerousness. “It’s a sad commentary 
that minorities, Hispanics and black people, 
are overrepresented in the criminal justice 
system,” Dr. Quijano testified. 
A prosecutor followed up. “The race factor, 
black, increases the future dangerousness for 
various complicated reasons — is that 
correct?” 
Dr. Quijano answered, “Yes.” 
One of Mr. Buck’s trial lawyers, Jerry 
Guerinot, has a dismal record in death 
penalty cases, having represented 20 people 
sentenced to death in Texas, more than are 
awaiting execution in about half of the states 
that have the death penalty. 
In their petition seeking Supreme Court 
review, Mr. Buck’s new lawyers said that his 
trial lawyers had been ineffective and that 
Mr. Buck’s death sentence was infected by 
racial bias. 
“Left uncorrected, trial counsel’s injection of 
explicit racial discrimination into Mr. Buck’s 
capital sentencing profoundly undermines 
confidence in the integrity of both Mr. 
Buck’s death sentence and the criminal 
justice system over all,” Mr. Buck’s lawyers 
told the justices. 
The cases will be argued during the court’s 
next term, which starts in October. 
In turning down an earlier appeal from Mr. 
Buck in 2011 based on assertions of 
prosecutorial misconduct, five justices 
expressed misgivings about what had 
happened at his trial. 
Calling Dr. Quijano’s testimony “bizarre and 
objectionable,” Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr., 
joined by Justices Antonin Scalia and 
Stephen G. Breyer, indicated that there were 
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serious questions about the conduct of Mr. 
Buck’s own lawyers. 
“Dr. Quijano’s testimony would provide a 
basis for reversal of petitioner’s sentence if 
the prosecution were responsible for 
presenting that testimony to the jury,” Justice 
Alito wrote. “But Dr. Quijano was a defense 
witness, and it was petitioner’s attorney, not 
the prosecutor, who first elicited Dr. 
Quijano’s view regarding the correlation 
between race and future dangerousness.” 
Justice Sonia Sotomayor, joined by Justice 
Elena Kagan, said she would have voted to 
hear the case even as a challenge to 
prosecutorial misconduct. She noted that in 
2000 the state’s attorney general, John 
Cornyn, had seemed to promise to allow new 
sentencings for several inmates, including 
Mr. Buck, who had been sent to death row 
based in part on Dr. Quijano’s testimony. 
Texas prosecutors now say Mr. Buck’s 
appeal is barred on procedural grounds. 
The justices also agreed on Monday to hear 
an appeal from Bobby J. Moore, who has 
been on death row since 1980 for fatally 
shooting a 72-year-old Houston supermarket 
clerk, James McCarble, during a robbery. 
That case, Moore v. Texas, No. 15-797, raises 
questions about whether Texas uses outdated 
standards in assessing whether a defendant’s 
intellectual disability was severe enough to 
bar his execution. 
When the court ruled in 2002 in Atkins v. 
Virginia that the Constitution forbade the 
execution of people with mental disabilities, 
it gave states only general guidance. It said a 
finding of intellectual disability required 
proof of three things: “subaverage 
intellectual functioning,” meaning low I.Q. 
scores; a lack of fundamental social and 
practical skills; and the presence of both 
conditions before age 18. The court said I.Q. 
scores under “approximately 70” typically 
indicated disability. 
In 2014, in Hall v. Florida, though, the court 
ruled that Florida’s I.Q. score cutoff was too 
rigid to decide which mentally disabled 
individuals must be spared the death penalty. 
“Florida seeks to execute a man because he 
scored a 71 instead of 70 on an I.Q. test,” 
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote for the 
majority in a 5-to-4 decision. 
In Mr. Moore’s case, a trial court found that 
he was intellectually disabled and 
constitutionally ineligible for the death 
penalty. An appeals court reversed that 
decision, saying the lower court had erred by 
“employing the definition of intellectual 
disability presently used.” 
The appeals court ruled that a 23-year-old 
standard applied instead and that, under it, 
Mr. Moore was not intellectually disabled. 
When the Supreme Court announced on 
Monday morning that it would hear Mr. 
Moore’s case, it said the justices would also 
consider a second question: whether 
executing a condemned inmate more than 35 
years after he was sentenced to death violates 
the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against 
cruel and unusual punishment. 
Some two hours later, the court issued a 
revised order, limiting its review to the 
intellectual-disability issue. 
Two members of the court, Justices Kennedy 
and Breyer, have invited challenges to 
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prolonged solitary confinement. “Years on 
end of near total isolation exact a terrible 
price,” Justice Kennedy wrote, for instance, 
in a concurrence last year, adding that “the 
condition in which prisoners are kept simply 
has not been a matter of sufficient public 
inquiry or interest.” 
The two justices will now have to await 
another case. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The court also agreed to hear an appeal in a 
gerrymandering challenge to Virginia’s 
legislative map, Bethune-Hill v. Virginia 
Board of Elections, No. 15-680. That case 
will also be argued in the next term. 
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“Supreme Court Makes Slip-Up In Death Penalty Case” 
 
The Huffington Post 
Cristian Farias 
June 7, 2016 
 
Evincing that things may be in a bit of 
disarray since the death of Justice Antonin 
Scalia, the Supreme Court on Monday made 
a misstep when agreeing to hear the case of a 
prisoner seeking to challenge his death 
sentence. 
The case was one of two death penalty 
appeals the court added to its docket for its 
next term, which begins in October. 
The Texas inmate, Bobby Moore, had 
actually asked the court to review two 
constitutional issues relating to his capital 
sentence: 
Supreme Court of the United States 
A Texas death row inmate who wanted his case heard by the 
Supreme Court raised two important questions. 
Both are significant questions, implicating 
recent decisions and statements by the 
Supreme Court or individual justices with 
respect to the death penalty or its application 
to specific defendants. 
As part of their usual Monday business, the 
justices issued an order at 9:30 a.m. noting 
that they would agree to hear the two 
questions raised by Moore’s petition: 
 
Supreme Court of the United States 
That was a big deal, because the second 
question of Moore’s petition — whether 
sitting on death row for 35 years amounts to 
cruel and unusual punishment — touches on 
one of the practices Justice Stephen Breyer 
has repeatedly singled out as problematic in 
America’s system of capital punishment. 
That development was short-lived.  
At around 11:44 a.m., a court spokeswoman 
alerted the press that the court had made a 
mistake and that now only the first question 
in Moore’s petition was accepted for review. 
The court accordingly amended the order and 
republished it on its website: 
 
Supreme Court of the United States 
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That means Moore — who was convicted and 
sentenced to death in 1980 and has been 
awaiting punishment since — will not get an 
answer to whether the length of his 
confinement, much of which is in complete 
isolation, violates the Constitution. 
The remaining question in his case is still 
important: The Supreme Court will now 
decide whether states may rely on outdated 
medical standards when determining whether 
a person who is intellectually disabled merits 
the death penalty. 
The Supreme Court has already ruled that it’s 
unconstitutional to sentence to death 
someone who is intellectually disabled, and 
that states may not use rigid “cutoff” tests 
when assessing a person’s mental disability. 
States, however, are far from consistent in the 
assessments they use. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For Moore, this is a matter of life and death: 
Relying on experts, a court had determined 
that he bore all the hallmarks of someone who 
was intellectually disabled – including an IQ 
of 70, deplorable school performance, and 
“sub-normal intellectual functioning.” But 
Texas has resisted these findings and has 
insisted that Moore be assessed using older 
medical standards for intellectual disability. 
Here’s hoping the court’s final decision in the 
case will bring some clarity to that area of the 
law, if not to those who were a little confused 
by its actions on Monday.
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“Houston Man on Death Row 35 Years Loses Appeal” 
 
NBC Local Affiliate- Dallas-Ft. Worth 
September 16, 2015 
 
The state's highest criminal court has upheld 
the death sentence of one of Texas' longest-
serving death row inmates. 
A divided Texas Court of Criminal Appeals 
on Wednesday rejected arguments that 55-
year-old Bobby James Moore is mentally 
impaired and ineligible for execution. 
Two of the eight judges involved in the ruling 
disagreed with the majority. 
Moore has been on death row since July 
1980, three months after a 72-year-old 
Houston supermarket clerk, James 
McCarble, was fatally shot during a robbery. 
Only six of the state's some 250 condemned 
inmates have been on death row longer. 
Moore received a new punishment hearing in 
2001 after a federal court threw out his 
original death sentence. 
In 1986, the Houston man came within 10 
hours of execution before he received a 
federal court reprieve. 
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“Supreme Court to Hear Death Penalty Cases” 
 
The New York Times 
Adam Liptak 
June 6, 2016 
In 2002, the Supreme Court barred the 
execution of the intellectually disabled. But it 
gave states a lot of leeway to decide just who 
was, in the language of the day, “mentally 
retarded.” 
Texas took a creative approach, adopting 
what one judge there later called “the Lennie 
standard.” That sounds like a reference to an 
august precedent, but it is not. The Lennie in 
question is Lennie Small, the dim, hulking 
farmhand in John Steinbeck’s “Of Mice and 
Men.” 
The Lennie in question is fictional. 
Still, Judge Cathy Cochran of the Texas 
Court of Criminal Appeals wrote in 2004 that 
Lennie should be a legal touchstone. 
“Most Texas citizens might agree that 
Steinbeck’s Lennie should, by virtue of his 
lack of reasoning ability and adaptive skills, 
be exempt” from the death penalty, she 
wrote. “But, does a consensus of Texas 
citizens agree that all persons who might 
legitimately qualify for assistance under the 
social services definition of mental 
retardation be exempt from an otherwise 
constitutional penalty?” 
Judge Cochran, who later said she had reread 
“all of Steinbeck” in the 1960s while living 
above Cannery Row in Monterey, Calif., 
listed seven factors that could spare someone 
like Lennie, whose rash killing of a young 
woman was seemingly accidental. 
For instance: “Has the person formulated 
plans and carried them through, or is his 
conduct impulsive?” 
And: “Can the person hide facts or lie 
effectively?” 
This fall, in Moore v. Texas, No. 15-797, the 
United States Supreme Court will consider 
whether the Court of Criminal Appeals, 
Texas’ highest court for criminal matters, 
went astray last year in upholding the death 
sentence of Bobby J. Moore based in part on 
outdated medical criteria and in part on the 
Lennie standard. 
Mr. Moore killed James McCarble, a 70-
year-old grocery clerk, during a robbery in 
1980 in Houston. 
No one disputes that Mr. Moore is at least 
mentally challenged or, as a psychologist 
testifying for the prosecution put it at a 2014 
hearing, that he most likely “suffers from 
borderline intellectual functioning.” 
Mr. Moore reached his teenage years without 
understanding how to tell time, the days of 
the week or the relationship between 
subtraction and addition. His I.Q. has been 
measured as high as 78 and as low as 57, 
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averaging around 70. On the other hand, the 
psychologist testified, the young Bobby 
Moore had shown skill at mowing lawns and 
playing pool. 
The state judge who heard this evidence, 
relying on current medical standards on 
intellectual disability, concluded that 
executing Mr. Moore would violate the 
Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and 
unusual punishment. 
But the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed 
the ruling, saying the judge had made a 
mistake in “employing the definition of 
intellectual disability presently used.” 
Under medical standards from 1992, 
endorsed in Judge Cochran’s 2004 opinion, 
Mr. Moore was not intellectually disabled, 
the appeals court said. The court added that 
the seven factors listed in the 2004 opinion 
weighed heavily against Mr. Moore. He had, 
for instance, worn a wig during the robbery 
and tried to hide his shotgun in two plastic 
bags, which prosecutors said was evidence of 
forethought and planning. 
In dissent, Judge Elsa Alcala said the 1992 
medical standards used by the majority were 
“outdated and erroneous.” As for the seven 
factors, she wrote, “The Lennie standard does 
not meet the requirements of the federal 
Constitution.” 
“I would set forth a standard,” Judge Alcala 
wrote, “that does not include any reference to 
a fictional character.” 
In a brief, Ken Paxton, the state’s attorney 
general, defended the seven factors, though 
without mentioning Lennie. He also urged 
the Supreme Court to let judges and juries, 
rather than medical professionals, decide 
who should be spared the death penalty. 
That echoed a 2014 dissent from Justice 
Samuel A. Alito Jr., who said it was a bad 
idea to rely on the shifting views of medical 
experts to decide who must be spared 
execution based on intellectual disability. 
The majority in that case, Hall v. Florida, 
struck down Florida’s I.Q. score cutoff of 70 
as too rigid. 
In doing so, Justice Alito wrote, the majority 
had effectively overruled the part of its 2002 
Atkins v. Virginia decision that allowed 
states to use their own definitions of 
intellectual disability, and instead imposed 
“the evolving standards of professional 
societies, most notably the American 
Psychiatric Association.” 
An article last year in the Yale Law Journal 
presented an intriguing alternative to the 
evolving standards that bothered Justice 
Alito. Drawing on historical materials, 
Michael Clemente, then a law student at Yale 
and now a law clerk for a federal judge, 
demonstrated that the original understanding 
of the Eighth Amendment, based on English 
common law, barred the execution of people 
whose mental abilities were below those of 
an ordinary child of 14. 
Such a standard, steeped in originalism, a 
mode of constitutional interpretation 
embraced by Justice Clarence Thomas and 
the late Justice Antonin Scalia, would seem 
to spare both Mr. Moore and Lennie. On the 
other hand, it is not clear that Lennie himself 
would have escaped execution under Texas’ 
Lennie standard. He did, for instance, try to 
conceal his crime, hiding his victim’s body. 
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In a 1937 interview with The New York 
Times, John Steinbeck said he had based 
Lennie on a man who had killed a ranch 
foreman but was shown leniency. “Lennie 
was a real person,” Mr. Steinbeck said. “He’s 
in an insane asylum in California right now.” 
Seventy-five years later, Mr. Steinbeck’s son 
Thomas heard about Texas’ Lennie standard. 
“The character of Lennie was never intended 
to be used to diagnose a medical condition 
like intellectual disability,” Thomas 
Steinbeck, who died this month, said in a 
2012 statement. “I find the whole premise to 
be insulting, outrageous, ridiculous and 
profoundly tragic.” 
“I am certain that if my father, John 
Steinbeck, were here, he would be deeply 
angry and ashamed to see his work used in 
this way,” he said. “And the last thing you 
ever wanted to do was to make John 
Steinbeck angry.” 
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Manuel v. City of Joliet 
15-9496 
Ruling Below: Manuel v. City of Joliet, 590 F. App'x 641 (7th Cir. 2015) 
Manuel was subject of a traffic stop on March 18, 2011. The officer claimed to detect the odor of 
cannabis, and proceeded to drag Manuel out of the vehicle and cuff him. The officer found a 
bottle of pills on Manuel during a pat down. The pills were then tested by officers who had 
arrived at the scene. These officers falsified results to show the pills as ecstasy. Later tests 
showed this to be false. Manuel was then held for more than a month before the charges were 
dropped, resulting in personal and professional costs.  
Manuel filed suit on grounds of malicious prosecution, but the claims were dismissed. On 
appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 
Question Presented: Whether an individual’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from 
unreasonable seizure continues beyond legal process so as to allow a malicious prosecution 
claim based upon the Fourth Amendment. 
 
Elijah MANUEL, Plaintiff–Appellant, 
v. 
CITY OF JOLIET, et al., Defendants–Appellees. 
 
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit 
Decided on January 28, 2015 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted] 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern 
Division. No. 13 C 3022, Milton I. Shadur, 
Judge. 
 
Before DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge, 
ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit 
Judge, JOHN DANIEL TINDER, Circuit 
Judge. 
 
ORDER 
 
Elijah Manuel appeals the dismissal of his 
complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging 
that the City of Joliet and several of its police 
officers maliciously prosecuted him when 
they falsified the results of drug tests and then 
arrested him for possession with intent to 
distribute ecstasy. The district court 
dismissed his claim as foreclosed by 
Newsome v. McCabe, because Illinois law 
already provided an adequate remedy for 
malicious prosecution. Manuel asks this 
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court to reconsider Newsome but offers no 
compelling reason to do so. We affirm. 
 
Manuel alleged the following in connection 
with his arrest on March 18, 2011 for 
possession with intent to distribute ecstasy. 
On that day he was a passenger in his car 
being driven by his brother when they were 
stopped for failing to signal. A police officer 
detected an odor of burnt cannabis from 
inside the car. Without warning, the officer 
flung open the passenger's door and dragged 
Manuel out. The officer pushed Manuel to 
the ground, handcuffed him, and then 
punched and kicked him. The officer then 
patted down Manuel, and in one pocket found 
a bottle of pills. The pills were then tested by 
officers who had arrived at the scene, and 
these officers falsified the results to show that 
the pills were ecstasy. Based on these results, 
Manuel was arrested. In grand jury 
proceedings on March 31, the police 
continued to lie about the test results. 
 
But according to a lab report of April 1, 2011, 
that Manuel submitted with his complaint, 
the pills were not ecstasy. Yet Manuel was 
arraigned on April 8, 2011, and not for more 
than a month—until May 4, 2011—did the 
Assistant State's Attorney seek dismissal of 
the charges. Manuel was released the next 
day. Because of his incarceration, Manuel 
missed work and his college classes, forcing 
him to drop courses he already paid for. 
 
On April 10, 2013, Manuel sued the City of 
Joliet and various City of Joliet police 
officers alleging malicious prosecution 
because of the falsified drug tests and other 
civil rights claims that stemmed from his 
arrest (unreasonable search and seizure, 
excessive force, violation of due process 
rights, conspiracy to deprive constitutional 
rights, unreasonable detention, failure to 
intervene, and denial of equal protection of 
laws). 
The court dismissed most of the § 1983 
claims as time-barred because they fell 
outside the two-year statute of limitations. As 
for the malicious-prosecution claim—which 
was not time-barred because the statute of 
limitations did not begin tolling until May 4, 
2011, when the underlying proceedings were 
terminated in Manuel's favor—the court 
treated it as barred under Newsome because 
Illinois law provided an adequate remedy. 
 
On appeal Manuel challenges only the 
dismissal of his malicious-prosecution claim 
and argues that the claim, as one in which the 
police misrepresented evidence, fits into an 
area of law that Newsome did not foreclose. 
He invokes Johnson v. Saville, in which we 
stated that “Newsome left open the possibility 
of a Fourth Amendment claim against 
officers who misrepresent evidence to 
prosecutors.” 
 
Newsome held that federal claims of 
malicious prosecution are founded on the 
right to due process, not the Fourth 
Amendment, and thus there is no malicious 
prosecution claim under federal law if, as 
here, state law provides a similar cause of 
action. Newsome did not preclude Fourth 
Amendment claims generally, but we have 
cautioned that “there is nothing but confusion 
gained by calling [a] legal theory [brought 
under the Fourth or any other amendment] 
‘malicious prosecution.’ ” As the district 
court noted, any Fourth Amendment claim 
that Manuel might bring is time-barred. 
Fourth Amendment claims are typically 
“limited up to the point of arraignment,” after 
which it becomes a malicious prosecution 
claim. Thus if Manuel has a Fourth 
Amendment claim not barred by Newsome, it 
would have stemmed from his arrest on 
March 18, 2011, which he would have had to 
challenge within two years, but he did not sue 
until April 10, 2013. And in any event, 
179 
 
Manuel has no Fourth Amendment right to be 
free from groundless prosecution.  
 
Next Manuel argues that we should 
reconsider our holding in Newsome and 
recognize a federal claim for malicious 
prosecution under the Fourth Amendment 
regardless of the available state remedy. By 
his count, ten other circuits have recognized 
federal malicious-prosecution claims under 
the Fourth Amendment—assuming that the 
plaintiff has been seized in the course of the 
malicious prosecution.  
 
Manuel does not provide a compelling reason 
to overrule our precedent. As we stated in our 
most recent endorsement of Newsome's 
rationale: “When, after the arrest or seizure, a 
person is not let go when he should be, the 
Fourth Amendment gives way to the due 
process clause as a basis for challenging his 
detention.” While Manuel's counsel 
advanced a strong argument, given the 
position we have consistently taken in 
upholding Newsome, Manuel's argument is 
better left for the Supreme Court. 
Manuel tries to distinguish Llovet on grounds 
that he was arrested without probable cause 
and incarcerated for seven weeks. Although 
Llovet is largely about the theory of 
“continuing seizures” and thus 
distinguishable from Manuel's facts, we said 
in that case that “once detention by reason of 
arrest turns into detention by reason of 
arraignment ... the Fourth Amendment falls 
out of the picture and the detainee's claim that 
the detention is improper becomes a claim of 
malicious prosecution violative of due 
process.” Only if state law fails to provide an 
adequate remedy can a plaintiff pursue a 
federal due process claim for malicious 
prosecution, and Illinois has an adequate 
remedy.  
 
AFFIRMED.
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“U.S. Supreme Court to hear Joliet police case” 
 
Chicago Tribune 
David Savage 
January 15, 2016 
 
The Supreme Court said Friday it would hear 
a case involving allegations of police 
misconduct in Joliet and decide whether a 
person who was wrongly arrested can sue for 
"malicious prosecution." 
Elijah Manuel, who is black, says he was 
stopped and pulled over in his car by white 
police officers in Joliet. He said they used 
racial slurs and arrested him because they 
wrongly concluded that a bottle of vitamins 
was illegal Ecstasy. He accused the officers 
of lying. 
He was booked in the county jail and held for 
weeks after officers testified the pills were 
illegal. A judge released him seven weeks 
later because lab tests had shown the pills 
were vitamins. But when Manuel sued Joliet 
and its officers for a "malicious prosecution" 
that violated his rights against "unreasonable 
searches and seizures," a federal judge and 
the U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals in 
Chicago said he had no claim, even if all he 
alleged was true. The high court voted to hear 
his appeal in the case of Manuel vs. City of 
Joliet. 
 
 
 
The case is likely to be argued in April and 
decided by the end of June. 
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“Justices To Hear 4th Amendment Malicious Prosecution Case” 
 
Law360 
Carmen Germaine 
January 19, 2016 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court on Tuesday agreed 
to consider whether an Illinois man can sue 
under the Fourth Amendment for malicious 
prosecution after being arrested and charged 
on falsified evidence, taking up an issue that 
has divided appellate courts. 
The high court granted Elijah Manuel’s 
petition for writ of certiorari after Manuel 
argued that the Seventh Circuit is the only 
federal appellate court to explicitly bar 
plaintiffs from bringing malicious 
prosecution claims under the Fourth 
Amendment if they are held in prison on false 
charges or without probable cause even after 
undergoing a legal process such as an 
arraignment. 
“In light of the deep divisions between the 
Seventh Circuit and the 10 other circuits, 
Manuel should be given an answer that is not 
merely based upon a Seventh Circuit 
precedent which has been repeatedly rejected 
by the other circuits. We ask that this court 
definitively provide him with an answer as to 
the availability of a Fourth Amendment 
malicious prosecution claim,” the petition 
said. 
Manuel filed his original lawsuit in April 
2013 against the city of Joliet, Illinois, and 
several police officers, alleging the officers 
falsely arrested him in March 2011 on 
charges of drug possession and intent to 
distribute ecstasy. He was arraigned in April 
2011, several days after a state police lab 
report found that pills in Manuel’s possession 
were not a controlled substance, and held in 
prison until a prosecutor motioned in May to 
dismiss the charges based on the lab report 
results, according to Manuel’s petition. 
Manuel filed his petition in April 2015, after 
the Seventh Circuit in January affirmed an 
Illinois federal court decision dismissing his 
suit. The appellate court relied on a previous 
ruling that plaintiffs can’t bring claims for 
malicious prosecution under the Fourth 
Amendment if they have an adequate state 
law remedy, finding that Manuel could have 
sued under Illinois law. 
The Seventh Circuit acknowledged Manuel’s 
argument that 10 other appellate courts have 
affirmatively held that the Fourth 
Amendment right to be free from unlawful 
seizure extends “through the pretrial period,” 
even after an arraignment, but said that his 
argument is “better left for the Supreme 
Court.” 
In his petition for writ of certiorari, Manuel 
argued that the Seventh Circuit had 
improperly interpreted the Supreme Court’s 
1994 ruling in Albright v. Oliver, which held 
in a plurality opinion that a man who was 
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allegedly held without probable cause should 
have brought his malicious prosecution 
claims under the Fourth Amendment instead 
of as due process claims. 
According to Manuel, the Seventh Circuit’s 
holding is improperly based on a concurring 
opinion in Albright that said individuals only 
have Fourth Amendment claims if they don’t 
have an adequate remedy under state law, 
even though “an overwhelming majority” of 
other appellate courts have found malicious 
prosecution is a Fourth Amendment violation 
regardless of what state law remedies are 
available to the individual. 
Manuel said in his petition that the case is 
particularly important because malicious 
prosecution claims allow greater damages 
than claims of false arrest or false 
imprisonment. False arrest claims last only 
until the individual undergoes some legal 
process, such as an arraignment, whereas 
plaintiffs can sue for malicious prosecution 
for damages from the entire pretrial period, 
encompassing “a greater variety of injuries,” 
Manuel said. 
Manuel also argued that the case is the “ideal 
vehicle” to address the circuit split because 
his claim can “only succeed as a Fourth 
Amendment claim” as any state-law claims 
he may have for malicious prosecution are 
time-barred, whereas the Fourth Amendment 
claims would be subject to a two-year statute 
of limitations. 
An attorney for Manuel, Stanley Bert 
Eisenhammer of Hodges Loizzi 
Eisenhammer Rodick & Kohn LLP, told 
Law360 Tuesday that the case is important as 
a potential deterrent to police misconduct. 
"The importance of this case is it will correct 
a Seventh Circuit decision which is contrary 
to the other circuits that will provide, if we 
get the Seventh Circuit reversed, deterrents 
from police misconduct when arresting 
individuals and attempting to prosecute them 
without providing appropriate evidence," 
Eisenhammer said. 
Representatives for the city of Joliet did not 
respond Tuesday to a request for comment. 
Manuel is represented by Stanley Bert 
Eisenhammer and Pamela E. Simaga of 
Hodges Loizzi Eisenhammer Rodick & Kohn 
LLP. 
The City of Joliet is represented by Martin J. 
Shanahan. 
The case is Manuel v. City of Joliet et al., case 
number 14-9496, in the Supreme Court of the 
United States.
 
